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Information Systems (IS) are critical for employee productivity and organizational 
success. Data breaches are on the rise—with thousands of data breaches accounting for 
billions of records breached and annual global cybersecurity costs projected to reach 
$10.5 trillion by 2025. A data breach is the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive 
information—and can be achieved intentionally or unintentionally. Significant causes of 
data breaches are hacking and human error; in some estimates, human error accounted for 
about a quarter of all data breaches in 2018. Furthermore, the significance of human error 
on data breaches is largely underrepresented, as hackers often capitalize on organizational 
users’ human errors resulting in the compromise of systems or information. The research 
problem that this study addressed is that organizational data breaches caused by human 
error are both costly and have the most significant impact on Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) breaches. Human error types can be classified in three categories—
Skill-Based Error (SBE), Rule-Based Mistakes (RBM), and Knowledge-Based Mistakes 
(KBM)—tied to the associated levels of human performance. The various circumstantial 
and contextual factors that influence human performance to cause or contribute to human 
error are called Performance Influencing Factors (PIF). These PIFs have been examined 
in the safety literature and most notably in Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
applications. The list of PIFs is context specific and had yet to be comprehensively 
established in the cybersecurity literature—a significant research gap.  
 
The main goal of this research study was to employ configurational analysis—
specifically, Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Analysis (fsQCA)—to empirically assess the 
conjunctural causal relationship of internal (individual) and external (organizational and 
contextual) Cybersecurity Performance Influencing Factors (CS-PIFs) leading to 
Cybersecurity Human Error (CS-HE) (SBE, RBM, and KBM) that resulted in the largest 
data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the United States 
(US). Feedback was solicited from 31 Cybersecurity Subject Matter Experts (SME), and 
they identified 1st order CS-PIFs and validated the following 2nd order CS-PIFs: 
organizational cybersecurity; cybersecurity policies and procedures; cybersecurity 
education, training, and awareness; ergonomics; cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and 
abilities; and employee cybersecurity fitness for duty. Utilizing data collected from 102 




CS-PIFs led to certain CS-HEs, that resulted in data breaches. Specifically, seven of the 
36 fsQCA models had solution consistencies that exceeded the minimum threshold of 
0.80, thereby providing argument for the contextual nature of CS-PIFs, CS-HE, and data 
breaches. Two additional findings were also discovered—five sufficient configurations 
were present in two models, and the absence of strong cybersecurity knowledge, skills, 
and abilities is a necessary condition for all cybersecurity human error outcomes in the 
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Information Systems (IS)—critical for employee productivity—enable organizations 
to communicate, collaborate, and conduct business or operations (Hua & Bapna, 2013; 
Jensen et al., 2014; Sabherwal et al., 2019; Thomson & von Solms, 2005). Unfortunately, 
IS comes at a cost—it must be protected from nefarious actors and unintentional actions 
that could compromise the security of the IS. IS security involves maintaining the 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) of information and IS (Ayyagari, 2012; 
Zimmerman & Renaud, 2019). A common type of IS security compromise is known as a 
data breach, which can be defined as the “unauthorized access or inadvertent disclosure 
of sensitive information” (Ayyagari, 2012, p. 33). 
Data breaches are worldwide phenomena affecting many countries and industries 
around the world (Ponemon Institute, 2021). Data breaches are costly to organizations in 
resolving the breach incident and to consumers when their records are compromised 
(Carre et al., 2018; Garrison & Ncube, 2011). Ponemon Institute’s (2021) Cost of Data 
Breach study examined 537 data breaches in 17 countries and 17 industries, and found 
that the average data breach cost was about $4.24 million, or an average cost of $161 per 




In the United States (US), data breaches that compromise 500 or more individuals’ 
health records must be reported to the US Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) (US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2020). All 
50 US states have laws that require breached companies to notify residents that their data 
was compromised (Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 2018). Causes for data breaches are 
attributed to system glitches, external actors, and internal actors (insiders) (Garrison & 
Ncube, 2011; Kennedy, 2016; Pigni et al., 2018; Ramim & Levy, 2006; Zimmerman & 
Renaud, 2019). 
Insiders are organizational members with privileged access to persons, systems, 
processes, and facilities (Clarke & Levy, 2017; Hua & Bapna, 2013; Nurse et al., 2014; 
Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019). Organizational insider threats can be malicious or non-
malicious (Hua & Bapna, 2013; Nurse et al., 2014; Vroom & von Solms, 2004; 
Zimmerman & Renaud, 2019). Human error has increasingly been attributed as a 
significant cause for data breaches (Chernyshev et al., 2019; Evans et al., 2019; 
Metalidou et al., 2014). The Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) (2018) estimated that 
for 2017, their Data Breach Employee Error / Negligence / Improper Disposal / Loss 
attack category accounted for only 10.4% of data breach cases, but accounted for 81.5% 
of records breached. Furthermore, ITRC’s other categories may also involve human error 
as a contributor to the breach.  
Although human error is known to be a contributor to data breaches, the understanding 
of what causes human error in cybersecurity contexts is extremely limited. On the other 
hand, human error in safety in the context of manufacturing, healthcare, nuclear, 




(Senders & Moray, 1991; Xing et al., 2017). In fact, formal Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA) methods have been developed in safety applications with an aim to reduce the 
likelihood and consequence of human errors in complex systems (Evans, et al., 2019; 
Groth, 2009).  
A key component of HRA methods are Performance Influencing Factors (PIF)—the 
various circumstantial and contextual factors that influence human performance to cause, 
or contribute to, human error (Franciosi et al., 2019; Groth, 2009). Internal (individual) or 
external (organizational and contextual) PIFs were assessed; following Curado et al. 
(2018), assessing that the antecedent at only one level does not fully explain the 
relationship between conditions and outcomes. In this study, PIFs in cybersecurity 
contexts are titled Cybersecurity PIF (CS-PIF), and human error in cybersecurity contexts 
are titled Cybersecurity Human Error (CS-HE).  
This research examined CS-PIFs as contributors to CS-HE resulting in data breaches 
using existing known and documented incidents. Fuzzy-set theory was used to calibrate 
the degree of membership (i.e. presence or absence) of CS-PIFs and CS-HE in each case, 
which is appropriate as CS-PIFs and CS-HE can vary by level or degree (Pena & Curado, 
2007; Ragin, 2009). Groth (2009) found that PIFs have varying levels of 
interdependencies and interactions to result in a human error. Thus, Fuzzy-Set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) was used to examine the conjunctural causal relationship 
of CS-PIFs resulting in CS-HE leading to the data breaches (Rihoux, 2006). Schneider & 
Rohlfing (2016) defined conjunctural causation as when "multiple conditions occur 





The research problem that this study addressed is that organizational data breaches 
caused by human error are both costly and have the most significant impact on Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) breaches (81.5%) (Greitzer et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2019; 
Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). The problem set of human error is not new, and Reason 
(1990) defined human error as “a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which 
a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, 
and when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency” 
(p. 9). Human error has been examined broadly in the literature—mostly on the topic of 
safety for industries such as medicine (Chernyshev et al. 2019; Gawron et al., 2006; 
Reason, 1995), aviation (Miller, 1976; Miranda, 2018; Shappell et al., 2007), space 
exploration (Boring et al., 2019; Maluf et al., 2005), nuclear reactors, and others (Reason, 
1990).  
Human errors are inevitable. Humans are not perfect in their activities and errors are 
often necessary for human evolution—when negative consequences are minimized—for 
benefits to include “learning, adaptation, creativity, and survival” (Senders & Moray, 
1991, p. 37). In addition, some errors are acceptable dependent on the risk to the 
organization and the user (Abdolrahmani et al., 2017; Zimmerman & Renaud, 2019). The 
Local Rationality Principle states that people do reasonable things given their goals, 
knowledge, and focus of attention (Dekker, 2006). However, high level of knowledge, 
skills, and abilities are the critical corner stone to ensure high level of competency, or 
lower level of human error during ones’ operations (Carlton & Levy, 2017).  
The public interest of human error in safety contexts is plentiful due to potential 




risks (Alonso & Broadribb, 2018; Senders & Moray, 1991). Although human errors in 
cybersecurity contexts are not reported in news outlets like hacking and ransomware, 
their damage in data breaches is otherwise widespread and documented (Evans et al., 
2019; Garrison & Ncube, 2011; Holtfreter & Harrington, 2015; Metalidou et al., 2014). 
In the IS discipline, human errors have been examined in areas of Information 
Technology (IT) implementation (Levine & Rossmoore, 1993); IT service support, 
delivery operations, and change management (Shwartz et al., 2010); knowledge 
management (Nielen et al., 2011); human-computer interaction (Maxion & Reeder, 
2005); systems development (Rouse, 1985); information privacy (Liginlal et al., 2009); 
and cybersecurity (Evans et al., 2019; Greitzer et al., 2014; Metalidou et al., 2014; Wood 
& Banks, 1993).  
Some of the organizational consequences of human error in IS are privacy breaches 
and data breaches (Liginlal et al., 2009; Metalidou et al., 2014). Human errors in IS are a 
risk to organizations that cannot be ignored (Carre et al., 2018; Cheng et al., 2006). A 
study by CERT Insider Threat Team (2013) focused on unintentional insider threats 
found that more than 40% of IT security professionals reported that “their greatest 
security concern is employees accidentally jeopardizing security through data leaks or 
similar errors” (p. 42). Human error can lead to disruption of CIA of information as well 
as IS, directly or indirectly (Enrici et al., 2010; Greitzer et al., 2014; Zimmermann & 
Renaud, 2019).  
With a focus on safety, Reason (1990) investigated the cognitive psychological 
aspects of human error in various industries to include medicine and aerospace. Reason’s 




Rasmussen’s Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) human performance framework—tying the 
tripartite of human performance: Skill Based Performance (SBP), Rule Based 
Performance (RBP), and Knowledge Based Performance (KBP) levels, to human error: 
Skill Based Error (SBE), Rule Based Mistake (RBM), and Knowledge Based Mistake 
(KBM) (Rasmussen, 1983). Reason (1990) characterized that SBP is utilized during 
routine activities; RBP and KBP are utilized during problem solving activities.  
Rasmussen (1983) characterized SBP as representing “sensory-motor performance 
during acts or activities which, following a statement of an intention, take place without 
conscious control as smooth, automated, and highly integrated patterns of behavior” (p. 
258). SBP requires minimal cognitive processing as the actor is already an expert in the 
routine action (Reason, 1990). RBP is used during familiar situations when problems are 
solved (or attempted to be solved) using stored rules or procedures (Bolton, 2017; 
Rasmussen, 1983; Reason, 1990). KBP is used during novel, unfamiliar situations, using 
slow, conscious analytical processes to solve problems (Bolton, 2017; Rasmussen, 1983; 
Reason, 1990). Actors can move between SBP, RBP, and KBP levels during their 
problem solving (Reason, 1990).  
During SBP, execution failure (observable failed actions) results in a slip, and storage 
failure (failure of memory) results in a lapse; slips and lapses are SBEs. In mistakes—
failure of planning—the actor is aware of a problem. During RBP, the failure of expertise 
(misapplication of a good rule or an application of a bad rule) results in RBM. During 
KBP, a lack of expertise results in KBM (Reason, 1990). A summary of Reason’s (1990) 
GEMS is shown in Figure 1. Several studies have examined human error in IS, but an 




HE that lead to data breaches is lacking (Ahmed et al., 2012; Evans et al., 2019; Kraemer 
& Carayon, 2007; Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019).  
 
Figure 1: Generic Error-Modeling System (GEMS) adapted from Reason (1990) 
Dissertation Goal 
The main goal of this research study was to employ configurational analysis to 
empirically assess the conjunctural causal relationship of internal (individual) and 
external (organizational and contextual) Cybersecurity Performance Influencing Factors 
(CS-PIFs) leading to Cybersecurity Human Error (CS-HE) (SBE, RBM, and KBM) that 
resulted in the largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 
in the US. The need for this research was conceptualized from the literature and empirical 
works from several fields. Senders and Moray (1991) summarized the knowledge 
presented at two scientific conferences (one in 1980 and one in 1983); an international 
panel of human error experts participated in these conferences to collaborate and advance 












































Reason’s (1990) GEMS model was later established as a framework for human error 
modeling, with Rasmussen’s (1983) SRK performance model contribution. The US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed several HRA methods over the years, 
to include Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain & Guttmann, 
1983), Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) 
(Gertman et al., 2005), Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) (Hallbert et al., 
2006), and Integrated Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS) (Xing et al., 2017). 
Within NRC’s HRA methods, PIFs are a key component described as the influence on 
human performance leading to human error (Whaley et al., 2016). Groth (2009) and 
Boring (2010) examined several HRA methods to compare PIFs. Although the PIFs 
presented in previous HRA methods were focused on safety, some of the same PIFs in 
isolation are recognized in the cybersecurity literature as contributing to human error 
(Boyce et al., 2011; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Kennedy, 2016; Kraemer & Carayon, 
2007; Rhee et al., 2009; Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019). Several researchers recognized 
the significance of human error on cybersecurity and data breaches (Evans et al., 2019; 
Greitzer et al., 2014; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019). 
Furthermore, several data breach databases and reports describe human error as a 
significant cause of data breaches (Identity Theft Resource Center, 2021; Ponemon 
Institute, 2021; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2021; Verizon, 2021). This study assessed 
the conjunctural role of CS-PIFs on CS-HE leading to data breaches.  
This research developed the Generic Error-Modeling Comparative for Data Breach 
Framework (GEMC-DBF) to empirically assess the conjunctural relationship of CS-PIFs 




breaches in the US from 2007 through 2019 (LexisNexus, 2021; Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2021). The GEMC-DBF is shown in Figure 2. fsQCA was used to 
evaluate sufficient conditions (CS-PIFs) and configuration of conditions with the 
outcomes (error types) that led to data breaches (Balle et al., 2018; Cress & Snow, 2000; 
Ragin, 2009). Crisp-set QCA (csQCA) uses Boolean logic (crisp sets) to establish 
memberships; the derivative fsQCA instead will be used as it allows partial membership 
using ordinal values (e.g. an action can partially be a rule-based mistake) (Melati et al., 
2021; Ragin, 2009).  
 
 





This research study had five specific goals. The first goal of this research study 
identified, using cybersecurity Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), the most common internal 
(individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to human error 
that result in data breaches. The second goal of this research study validated, using 
cybersecurity SMEs, the higher-order set of the most common internal (individual) and 
external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to human error that result in 
data breaches. The third specific goal of this study was to assess the alternative 
configurations of internal (individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-
PIFs leading to (a) skill-based errors; (b) rule-based mistakes; and (c) knowledge-based 
mistakes resulting in the largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 
2007 to 2019 in the US. The fourth specific goal of this study was to assess the 
alternative configurations of CS-PIFs responsible for CS-HE leading to various data 
breaches caused by: (a) unintended disclosure; (b) system misconfiguration; (c) social 
engineering; and (d) poor cybersecurity hygiene in the largest data breaches across 
multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US. The fifth specific goal of this 
study was to assess how alternative configurations of CS-PIFs on CS-HE leading to the 
largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US 
were represented across (a) industry type and (b) company size. 
Research Questions 
The main research question that this study addressed was: What is the conjunctural 
causal relationship, using configurational analysis, of internal (individual) and external 




breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US? Additionally, 
the following specific research questions (RQs) were addressed by this study: 
RQ1: What are the cybersecurity SMEs’ identified most common internal (individual) 
and external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to CS-HE that result in data 
breaches? 
RQ2: What are the cybersecurity SMEs’ validated higher-order set of the most 
common internal (individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs 
leading to human error that result in data breaches? 
RQ3: What are the alternative configurations of internal (individual) and external 
(organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to (a) skill-based errors; (b) rule-based 
mistakes; and (c) knowledge-based mistakes resulting in the largest data breaches across 
multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US? 
RQ4: What alternative configurations of CS-PIFs are responsible for CS-HE leading 
to various data breaches caused by: (a) unintended disclosure; (b) system 
misconfiguration; (c) social engineering; and (d) poor cybersecurity hygiene, in the 
largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US? 
RQ5: How are the alternative configurations of CS-PIFs on CS-HE leading to the 
largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US, 
represented across (a) industry type and (b) company size? 
Relevance and Significance 
Relevance 
Cybersecurity issues are problematic for individuals, organizations, and governments 




losses expected to reach $10.5 trillion by 2025 (Raju et al., 2021). In addition to financial 
losses, there are reputational damages to organizations and privacy breaches of 
individuals (Carre et al., 2018; Verizon, 2021). The consequential damage from data 
breaches has resulted in the enactment of several US federal statutes to protect 
consumers, and the enactment of State notification laws that have increased personal 
notifications and public awareness of data breaches (Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 2018).  
Data breach occurrences have been on the rise—the number of breaches has increased 
from 321 breaches in 2006 to 1579 breaches in 2017, according to the Identity Theft 
Resource Center’s (2018) reporting (see Figure 3). The overall number of records 
breached have also increased from 55 million in 2005 to 1.5 billion in 2018 (Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse, 2019). It is unclear how much the increased reporting 
requirements and public pressure influenced the sharp increase in data breach estimates 
over the years, but actual breaches are still underreported (Park, 2019).  
 
Figure 3: ITRC Data Breach Trend 2006–2017. Data retrieved from Identity Theft 















Interest in data breach investigations have rapidly increased in the last decade. Several 
organizations investigate and report data breach trends annually, to include Ponemon 
Institute (2021), Identity Theft Resource Center (2021), Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
(PRC) (2021), and Verizon (2021). Causes of data breaches vary in definition across the 
investigators. Due to the different categorizations, the role human error plays on data 
breaches vary by outlet. A summary of data breach causes and their share of cause of 
breaches is shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Data Breach Causes, data retrieved from Ponemon Institute (2017), Identity 
Theft Resource Center (2018), and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2019) 
Besides the system glitch category in Ponemon Institute’s study, all other causes of 
data breaches may be partly attributed to human error within the organization. Although 
human error is acknowledged to be a major contributor to data breaches, it appears to 
play a larger role than the reporting figures reveal (Pollini et al., 2021). For example, 
ITRC categorizes phishing attacks under the HACK category, but phishing requires a 
human vulnerability in the form of human error and susceptibility to an attacker’s deceit 
given that nowadays, most individuals are aware of the phenomena of phishing. Verizon 
(2017) further agreed by noting, “one could persuasively argue that all breaches have an 
error somewhere in the chain of events, but if it did not directly lead to the breach, it is 




IBM Security (2017) asserted that “spam email remains a primary tool in the 
attacker’s toolkit, reinforcing the pervasiveness of malware and the potential for 
inadvertent insider attacks” (p. 10), which further support that human error facilitates 
attacks. A simplified hypothetical example is illustrated in Figure 5 where the attacker 
and technology each play only one role in a spam email attack. The hacker may send 
thousands of these attacks to different organizations and the varying technology and 
people defenses within the organization will dictate the hacker’s success; the attacker 
construct rarely can be directly minimized. The blue arrows are illustrated as potential 
acts of human error.  
In Figure 5, the attacker has one role, which is to send the spam email with malicious 
content to users, often effortlessly, while technology has one role, attempt to block the 
spam email. Organizational management must support the cybersecurity professional, 
facilitate a security culture, and fund the spam filter. The cybersecurity professional must 
configure the spam filter properly and provide proper security training when using email. 
The user must use their security Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) to recognize 
spam emails and not fall victim to an attack.  
 




















Reason (2000)’s Swiss Cheese model of system accidents demonstrate how “defenses, 
barriers, and safeguards may be penetrated by an accident trajectory” (p. 769). Although 
originally developed for safety, Saarelainen and Jäntti (2015) modified the Swiss Cheese 
model to demonstrate similar human error causes for IT service incidents. The Swiss 
Cheese model is partially analogous to security-in-defense in security applications.  
A modified Swiss Cheese model in the cybersecurity context for spam email attack is 
shown in Figure 6. As shown, for the hacker to be successful, they must rely on the 
organization’s personnel to commit several errors (or failures). Schultz (2005) affirmed it 
by noting, “information security is primarily a people problem, not a technical problem” 
(p. 425). In summary, the relevance of this study is clear: data breaches are costly and 
more frequent, and the role of human error in data breaches is underrepresented and 
misunderstood.  
 








The significance of this research was to assess the conjunctural relationship of CS-
PIFs and CS-HEs so organizations can be cognizant and proactive of the interaction in 
the future. PIFs are the factors that attribute to human error. In the cybersecurity context, 
it appeared that this had yet to be well articulated or defined. This research outlined an 
SME-supported list of CS-PIFs that can be attributed to CS-HE leading to data breaches. 
By examining historical data breaches and identifying CS-PIFs, fsQCA was used to 
investigate which conjunctural combinations of CS-PIFs led to CS-HE in examined 
breaches.  
As a by-product of the research goals, this research also provided insight into the types 
of CS-HE that occurred in the examined data breaches. First, what type of human error 
was committed to cause a breach or set the conditions resulting in a breach? In a 
hypothetical phishing attack example, was it a Skill-Based Error (e.g. subconsciously 
clicking the link), Rule-Based Mistake (e.g. forwarding the identified phishing attack to a 
manager instead of IT, resulting in a breach), or Knowledge-Based Mistake (e.g. lack of 
expertise resulted in user clicking the link)? It was important to identify which type of 
human error occurred, as “the three levels will vary in the degree to which they are 
shaped by both intrinsic (cognitive biases, attentional limitations) and extrinsic factors 
(the structural characteristics of the task, context effects)” (Reason, 1990, p. 59). Finally, 
it is important for organizational leadership to understand what causes their employees to 
make bad decisions, as French et al. (2011) noted, “managers understand human 
behaviour; good managers understand human behaviour extremely well. To bring out the 
best in a team one needs to know how each will respond to a request, an instruction, an 




Barriers and Issues 
There were several potential barriers this study faced. A potential barrier was 
collecting responses from the same SMEs for research goal one (identifying common 
cybersecurity PIFs) and research goal two (validating higher-order set of common CS-
PIFs leading to human error that result in data breaches). For this study, having the same 
SMEs participate in both steps of the instrument development was important to improve 
the quality of the CS-PIF final set. As the SMEs were volunteers, they may have 
withdrawn from participating at any time, thereby skewing the results (Ellis & Levy, 
2009). To address this barrier, research goals one and two were combined into the same 
survey.  
Another potential barrier was SME participants not recognizing or understanding CS-
PIF terms and their role in data breaches. To mitigate this potential barrier, a section of 
CS-PIF definitions were provided in the survey to provide a baseline understanding for 
all survey participants. The definitions provided context on how certain CS-PIFs have 
attributed to human error in cybersecurity and safety.  
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are the factors that a researcher may take for granted as true, without 
proof, and may not necessarily hold true (Ellis & Levy, 2009). In this study, it was 
assumed that human cognition, behavior, and performance were entirely transferrable 
from safety to security. Although there were indicators of PIFs in cybersecurity, much 





Limitations are the researcher identified potential uncontrollable weaknesses in the 
study that may affect the internal validity of the study (Ellis & Levy, 2009). One such 
limitation was the scarcity of available data within data breach cases. Data breach details 
are generally limited as organizations are wary of sharing detailed information with 
regards to data breaches, either because of legal or reputational reasons. The same 
limitation is true for incident investigations in safety contexts (Boring, 2007). In this 
research, the largest breaches were examined due to more media coverage on those 
breaches, and thus, more information to identify the PIFs that occurred resulting in the 
human error leading to the breach. Future studies may be conducted with interview or 
survey methods to collect data breach detailed data on CS-PIF and CS-HE.  
Examining only the largest breaches created another limitation: this study’s findings 
represented the larger breaches. Breaches that were smaller in scope may have had 
different causes. Further research is warranted to cover the smaller to medium sized 
breaches with possibly other data collection methods. Another limitation was the use of 
historical data breach information for data collection—it is possible that CS-PIFs listed in 
specific breaches were represented as false-positive or false-negative, and may have 
influenced some of the analysis.  
Delimitations 
Delimitations define the boundaries and scope to make the research manageable, but 
also reduce generalizability (Ellis & Levy, 2009). This research did not attempt to reduce 
human error or the conditions leading to human error—this research instead surfaced the 
underlying baseline of conjunctural combination of conditions (PIFs) that resulted in 




knowledge generated in this research to investigate reduction in human error leading to 
data breaches by controlling PIFs, in controlled or natural settings. Additionally, due to 
the level of detail made public in larger data breaches, only the largest data breaches were 
examined. Finally, only US data breaches were examined.  
 
Definition of Terms 
Boolean minimization—“the ‘reduction’ of a long, complex expression into a shorter, 
more parsimonious expression” (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, p. 35). 
Calibration—“Calibration is the process of classifying conditions in each case from full 
membership (1.00) to full non‐membership (0.00)” (Curado, 2017, p. 83).  
Case—“Each configuration of causal conditions and the associated outcome becomes a 
case” (Crespo et al., 2021, p. 335). 
Causal asymmetry—“The presence and the absence of the outcome, respectively, may 
require different explanations” (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009, p. 9). 
Conditions—The variables within a case that produce the phenomenon of interest 
(outcome). Conditions can be thought of as the independent variables in quantitative 
methods (Rihoux, 2006). 
Configuration—A specific combination of conditions that produces a given outcome of 
interest (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. xix). 
Configurational Comparative Methods (CCM)—An umbrella term for methods and 
techniques—such as csQCA, mvQCA, and fsQCA, that are used to “enable the 
systematic comparative analysis of complex cases, those cases must be transformed into 




Conjunctural causation—When “multiple conditions occur together for producing the 
outcome" (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2016, p. 530). 
Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA)—The first QCA technique 
developed, as an instrument using Boolean and minimization algorithms for “identifying 
patterns of multiple conjunctural causation” and a tool to “simplify complex data 
structures in a logical and holistic manner” (Ragin, 1987, p. viii). 
Cybersecurity—“A computing-based discipline involving technology, people, 
information, and processes to enable assured operations in the context of adversaries. It 
involves the creation, operation, analysis, and testing of secure computer systems. It is an 
interdisciplinary course of study, including aspects of law, policy, human factors, ethics, 
and risk management” (Burley et al., 2017, p. 16).  
Cybersecurity Performance Influencing Factors (CS-PIF)—A term coined in this 
research to reference performance influencing factors that contribute to human error 
leading to cybersecurity contexts (Groth, 2009).  
Data breach—“unauthorized access or inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information” 
(Ayyagari, 2012, p. 33).  
Data triangulation—leverages the strength of one method on the others, and provides a 
more comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon of interest (Sands & Roer-Strier, 
2006). 
Equifinality—“Different paths can lead to the same outcome” (Berg-Schlosser et al., 
2009, p. 8). 




Fuzzy set membership—the pinpointed qualitative state of membership between full 
inclusion and full exclusion in a set (Ragin, 2009).  
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)—A type of qualitative 
comparative analysis, published in 2000 by Ragin to overcome the limitations of csQCA 
and its simple presence/absence dichotomies (crisp sets) by implementing fuzzy sets—
partial membership in sets (Ragin, 2009). 
Fuzzy-set theory—“A well-developed mathematical system for addressing partial 
membership in sets” (Ragin, 2009, p. 88). 
Generic Error-Modelling System (GEMS)—A conceptual framework “within which to 
locate the origins of the basic human error types” (p. 53)—which are skill-based slips 
(and lapses), rule-based mistakes, and knowledge-based mistakes (Reason, 1990). The 
structure was “derived in large part from Rasmussen’s skill-rule-knowledge classification 
of human performance” (Reason, 1990, p. 53).  
Human error—“a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned 
sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when 
these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency” (Reason, 
1990, p. 9). 
Human error types—Reason’s (1990) generic error-modelling system has three human 
error types: skill-based slips (and lapses), rule-based mistakes, and knowledge-based 
mistakes.  
Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA)—a system that a “data analysis 




performance and reliability data that are relevant to Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)” 
(Hallbert et al., 2006, p. 1). 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)—"Formal qualitative analysis and quantification 
methods available for use as part of Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) in modeling 
risk in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)” (p.1), more generally modelling human error 
(Whaley et al., 2016).  
Knowledge-Based Mistake (KBM)—Lack of knowledge failure occurs during 
knowledge-based performance “in novel situations where the solution to a problem has to 
be worked out on the spot without the help of preprogrammed solutions” (Reason, 1995, 
p. 81). 
Knowledge-Based Performance (KBP)—“During unfamiliar situations, faced with an 
environment for which no know-how or rules for control are available from previous 
encounters, the control of performance must move to a higher conceptual level, in which 
performance is goal-controlled” (Rasmussen, 1983, p. 259).  
Necessary Condition—“A condition is necessary for an outcome if it is always present 
when the outcome occurs. In other words, the outcome cannot occur in the absence of the 
condition” (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. xix).  
Outcomes—The phenomenon or consequence of interest in a case. Outcomes can be 
thought of as the dependent variable in quantitative methods (Rihoux, 2006). 
Performance Influencing Factor (PIF)—Originally called Performance Shaping 
Factors (PSFs), PIFs are the various circumstantial and contextual factors that influence 




Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)—An umbrella term that encompasses 
csQCA, msQCA, and fsQCA (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). 
Rule-Based Mistake (RBM)—Failures of expertise during rule-based performance 
occurring in several forms: “the misapplication of a good rule (usually because of a 
failure to spot the contraindications), the application of a bad rule, or the non-application 
of a good rule” (Reason, 1995, p. 81). 
Rule-Based Performance (RBP)—A problem-solving activity “typically controlled by a 
stored rule or procedure which may have been derived empirically during previous 
occasions, communicated from other persons’ know-how as instruction or a cookbook 
recipe, or it may be prepared on occasion by conscious problem solving and planning” 
(Rasmussen, 1983, p. 259).  
Skill-Based Error (SBE)—Failures during skill-based performance termed as slips 
(failure of action) and lapses (failure of memory) (Reason, 1995).  
Skill-Based Performance (SBP)—“Sensory-motor performance during acts or activities 
which, following a statement of an intention, take place without conscious control as 
smooth, automated, and highly integrated patterns of behavior” (Rasmussen, 1983, p. 
258). SBP occurs during routine and familiar activities where there are no problems 
identified (Reason, 1990).  
Skill-rule-knowledge framework—Jens Rasmussen’s (1983) categorization of the 
“three levels of performance correspond to decreasing levels of familiarity with the 
environment or task” (Reason, 1990, p. 43). The three levels are skill-based, rule-based, 




Sufficient Condition—“A condition is sufficient for an outcome if the outcome always 
occurs when the condition is present. However, the outcome could also result from other 
conditions” (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. xix). 
Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP)—“A method to predict 
human error probabilities and to evaluate the degradation of man-machine systems likely 
to be caused by human errors alone or in connection with equipment functioning, 
operational procedures and practices, or other system and human characteristics that 
influence system behavior” (Swain & Guttmann, 1983, p. 5-3). 
Truth Table—“A table of configurations” (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, p. 44). 
List of Acronyms 
Configurational Comparative Methods (CCM) 
Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) 
Cybersecurity Performance Influencing Factors (CS-PIF) 
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) 
Generic Error-Modelling System (GEMS) 
Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
Knowledge-Based Mistake (KBM) 
Knowledge-Based Performance (KBP) 
Performance Influencing Factor (PIF) 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
Rule-Based Mistake (RBM) 




Skill-Based Error (SBE) 
Skill-Based Performance (SBP) 
Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP) 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the research study. The background 
section described the need for information systems, the wide occurrence and damage of 
data breaches, and the threat human error has on causing data breaches. Additionally, 
human error in safety contexts was discussed, and specifically the construct of 
performance influencing factors was established.  
The problem statement was provided in the following section, which described how 
significant the cost and impact human error has on data breaches and PII breached. The 
dissertation goal section began with the main research goal, which is to employ 
configurational analysis to empirically assess the conjunctural causal relationship of 
internal (individual) and external (organizational and contextual) Cybersecurity 
Performance Influencing Factors (CS-PIFs) leading to Cybersecurity Human Error (CS-
HE) (SBE, RBM, and KBM) that resulted in the largest data breaches across multiple 
organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US. Additionally, five specific goals were 
stated, which sequentially help in achieving the main goal. The main research goal and 
five research questions were also provided.  
The relevance of human error’s role in data breaches was provided, which appears to 
be a relatively new research stream and research area of interest in cybersecurity. The 
significance section described how the research study could benefit organizations and 




assumptions, limitations, and delimitations were discussed to provide clarity on the 
details of the research. Finally, a definition of terms and list of acronyms were provided. 
The next chapter reviews the literature with respect to data breaches, human error, and 







Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction 
The literature review presented in this chapter spans the disciplines of cybersecurity, 
psychology, and human reliability. First, data breaches are defined and subsequently 
examined across time, place, and contexts. Second, human error is defined, dissected, and 
explained from a cognitive psychological perspective. Finally, the human error causes—
performance influencing factors—is explained and examined. Specifically, six 
performance influencing factors are examined: organizational cybersecurity; 
cybersecurity policies and procedures; cybersecurity education, training and awareness; 
cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and abilities; cybersecurity fitness for duty; and 
ergonomics.  
Due to the novel nature of this research, the literature review criteria had to be 
expanded in time and academic discipline. Many of these constructs and their influence 
on human error were “borrowed” or recognized from the safety literature (e.g. fatigue, 
situation awareness, etc.), and were not always recognized in the cybersecurity literature 
as tying these constructs (PIFs) to human error in cybersecurity contexts. The three main 




factors; their relationship and their influence on the research problem are the primary 
motive for the scope of this review.  
Data Breaches 
Information Systems and Cybersecurity 
Information Systems (IS) connect the world to facilitate communications, commerce, 
and education. IS consist of the environment, the technology, and the people (Taylor & 
Robinson, 2015). IS’s inherent vulnerabilities and numerous threats paved the way for the 
discipline of IS Security—also known as cybersecurity. The Federal Information Security 
Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 described information security as providing CIA to 
protect information and IS from “unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction” (US Congress, 2014, p. 128). Confidentiality can be defined 
as “preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for 
protecting personal privacy and proprietary information” (US Congress, p. 128). When 
organizations fail to maintain confidentiality of their consumer’s or customer’s private 
data, a data breach occurs.  
Data Breaches 
Rahulamathavan et al. (2016) defined a data breach as “a security incident in which 
sensitive, protected or confidential data is copied, transmitted, viewed, stolen, or lost” (p. 
363). Data breaches can occur when information is compromised in paper or electronic 
format (Holtfreter & Harrington, 2015). The unauthorized access can be deliberate (e.g., 
hacker) or unintentional (e.g., inadvertant recipient of email with PII content). Data 
breaches range in scope and severity. A data breach can affect as little as one computer or 




Organizational data breaches harm the organization and the consumer (Garrison & 
Ncube, 2011; Pigni et al., 2018). Data breaches can harm an organization’s brand, 
degrade consumer confidence, and cause monetary damages in the form of customer 
notifications, additional IT security investments, loss of revenue, and government fines 
(Carre et al., 2018; Zamosky, 2014). Additionally, different industries face breaches with 
different causes and information types. For example, where businesses, such as retail and 
finance, may compromise customer credit card or banking information in data breaches, 
medical organizations are more concerned with compromise of Personal Health 
Information (PHI) (Ayyagari, 2012; Chernyshev et al., 2019; Pigni et al., 2018).  
Human Error in Data Breaches  
Cybersecurity is a multifaceted problem—involving organizational, environmental, 
technological, and human components (Angst et al., 2017; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; 
Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019). In contrast to technological security countermeasures, 
relatively few studies have examined IS security from a psychological lens (Enrici et al., 
2010; Evans et al., 2019). In addition, many technical cyberattacks exploit human 
vulnerabilities. Human errors often introduce or contribute to vulnerabilities that lead to 
data breaches (Enrici et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2019). As a result, understanding and 
mitigating human errors can reduce accidental causes of data breaches (Evans et al., 
2019; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007).  
Cybersecurity issues are caused by external and internal threats, either intentionally or 
unintentionally (Cheng et al., 2017). Accidental causes can be a result of natural causes 
such as an electrical surge that takes down a network, or human error non-deliberate acts 




2019). Deliberate causes are conscious acts committed by internal or external actors, such 
as a hack or malware upload (Enrici et al., 2010; Pigni et al., 2018). Deliberate causes 
such as cyberattacks are often related to human errors, as the cyberattack can exploit a 
human error—such as a misconfigured and vulnerable device or a succumbing to a 
phishing attack (Enrici et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2019; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007).  
Other deliberate acts can be non-malicious, but intentional. For example, an employee 
may send an unencrypted email with PII to a colleague (against policy), and the email 
gets compromised by a hacker. Ayyagari (2012) argued that employees are the source of 
most data breaches, and employee non-compliance to security policies are one of the 
major causes. Human error is one of the most underestimated unintentional causes of 
cybersecurity incidents, as they often introduce and contribute to information security 
vulnerabilities that are dormant for attackers to capitalize on (Enrici et al., 2010; Evans et 
al., 2019).  
Human Error Data Breach Examples 
Verizon (2021) categorized several error varieties leading to data breaches: 
misconfiguration (allowing for unintended access), misdelivery (sending data to incorrect 
recipient), publishing error (exposing data on public website), loss, programming error, 
and other. An example of a publishing error—the US Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) fined Columbia University and New York-
Presbyterian Hospital $1.5 million and $3.3 million, respectively, after an employee 
accidently made 6,800 patient medical records publicly available (Zamosky, 2014). Data 
breaches caused by human error don’t exclusively happen in the cyberspace domain; an 




stolen after the credit union inadvertently and improperly disposed their records in a 
dumpster (Taylor & Robinson, 2015). A brief data breach literature summary is shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 
Summary of Data Breach Literature 
Study Methodology Sample 
Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Angst et al., 
2017 
Empirical Study 5,000 hospitals 
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As noted, many data breaches are caused by human error, and human error is the result 
of failure in human performance. Human error is not exclusive to cybersecurity though, 
as a great deal of research has been done in human factors (Rasmussen, 1983), 
psychology (Reason, 1990), and human reliability analysis (Evans et al., 2019; French et 
al., 2011). Interest in these fields is warranted due to human error having caused, as of the 
time of their publication, over 90% of failures in the nuclear industry (Reason, 1990); 
over 80% of failures in the chemical and petro-chemical industries, over 75% of marine 
casualties, and over 70% of aviation accidents (French et al., 2011).  
Human Performance  
Rasmussen (1983) distinguished three levels of human performance: skill-based, rule-
based, and knowledge-based performance. Skill-Based Performance (SBP) is performed 
during routine activities, and does not involve conscious attention or control. Rule-Based 
Performance (RBP) is performed consciously, is goal-oriented, and accomplished using 
stored rules or procedures (acquired previously or provided). Knowledge-Based 
Performance (KBP) is performed consciously during unfamiliar situations, is goal-
oriented, and accomplished using higher level decision making.  
French et al. (2011) recognized that human behavior is complex and influenced by 
internal and external factors; this posits their position that terminology such as “error” in 
HRA as invalid as they are socially defined. In other words, the employee or user more-
often-than-not committed a reasonable action provided the internal and external condition 
influences (PIFs), and context that led to the unreasonable outcome. French et al. (2011) 
provided the example of the Three Mile Island Accident in 1979, “where the formation of 




unanticipated and unprecedented in reactor designs; the operators behaved and executed 
as best as they could, provided the circumstances. Compare this to potential cybersecurity 
lapses where an effective zero-day social engineering tactic is used against a well-
intentioned and security aware user.  
Human Errors and Violations 
Following Rasmussen’s (1983) Skill, Rule, and Knowledge (SRK) based performance 
framework, Reason (1990) developed the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) that 
ties the three levels of human performance to human error. Skill-Based Errors (SBE) 
occur during periods of SBP. SBE can be separated into slips and lapses—a slip is the 
failure of action (Norman, 1981) and lapse is the failure of memory (Reason, 1990). 
Rule-Based Mistakes (RBM) occur during RBP, when the actor misapplies a good rule or 
applies a bad rule. Knowledge-Based Mistakes (KBM) occur during KBP and are a result 
of a lack of expertise.  
A fourth departure from desired human performance are violations. While SBE, RBM, 
and KBM are committed due to faulty information and cognitive processing, violations 
are undesired deliberate acts in the social context—those that oppose governed policies 
and procedures (Reason et al., 1990). Violations can be deliberate, but non-malicious 
(Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). Malicious violations are categorized as sabotage, and 
although problematic, are outside the scope of this research.  
Regarding violations, are those that drink alcohol and drive intoxicated bad people? 
Or have they simply made a bad decision even though they are fully aware of the law and 
sanctions? The same can be said in cybersecurity contexts; if connecting USB drives are 




expedite their work, are they automatically a bad person? Parker et al. (1992) suggest 
that the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) can be used to explain how several factors 
may contribute to inappropriate decisions. In this study, non-malicious violations are 
grouped into KBM.  
Human error is not a black and white problem, and, the contributors to human error 
can vary, especially across contexts. Gawron et al. (2006) found that medical errors can 
be attributed to incorrectly followed procedures, over-stressed workflows, poor 
readability of instructions, or physician knowledge. Shappell et al. (2007) used SMEs to 
examine over 1,000 commercial aviation accidents and found that aircrew and their 
environment caused most of the accidents, as opposed to unsafe supervision or 
organizational influences. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 2018 
report of 2.5 million US crashes between 2005–2007 found that drivers were the critical 
reason (i.e. last event in the crash causal chain) for crashes roughly 94% of the time, with 
the vehicle failure and environment each accounting for 2% (Singh, 2018). In other 
words, when it comes to human error, context matters.  
GEMS in Cybersecurity 
Stanton et al. (2005) developed a two-factor taxonomy of end user security behaviors 
comprising of intentions (malicious to benevolent) and expertise (novice to expert) (see 
Figure 7). Employees with malicious intentions can cause serious damage—but again, 
they are outside the scope of this research. Employees with benevolent intentions seek to 
cause a benefit to the organization. In this research we will examine security behaviors 





Figure 7: Two-factor Taxonomy of End User Security Behaviors. Adapted from 
Stanton et al. (2005) 
Cybersecurity human error can occur in all levels of the organization—from the end 
user, the system administrators, to the policy makers and management that institute 
corporate strategy and guidance. An end user may engage in unsafe web browsing at 
work that can lead to inadvertent actions resulting in malware or data breach (Goode et 
al., 2018). This consequence may have been a result of a (ill-advised) violation against 
policy. Some users make a rationalized decision to commit violations of organization IT 
policies that put the system at risk (Barlow et al., 2013; Gcaza et al., 2017; Siponen & 
Vance, 2010). The user’s intention may not be to cause malice, but rather, circumvent the 
policies to achieve a positive business outcome (Vance & Siponen, 2012). The policy by 
itself may not be sufficient for compliance, but in conjunction with training or education 
























Other examples of human error may not be so clear-cut or identifiable as to which 
human error type it is. As an example, an experienced network engineer setting up a new 
network may inadvertently open a security exploit in the network configuration, by 
committing a SBE, RBM, or KBM—depending on the circumstance or context. For 
example, the engineer may have been distracted and misconfigured the switch (SBE) or 
inexplicably forgot to save the configuration (SBE); followed a bad procedure (RBM), or 
their lack of experience failed them in configuring the switch properly (KBM) (Pollini et 
al., 2021; Stanton et al., 2005). Configuration mistakes can leave security applications, 
systems, or network boundaries vulnerable (Ahmed et al., 2012; Pollini et al., 2021). In 
the safety industry, human reliability analysis helps to understand the problem of human 
error.  
Human Reliability Analysis 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods are used to classify and quantify human 
performance (Boring, 2007; Evans et al., 2019). Additionally, HRA methods evaluate 
risks contributed by human error by identifying human errors, predicting the likelihood of 
human error, and reducing the likelihood (Evans et al., 2019; Ung & Shen, 2011). HRA 
originated from the 1960s US nuclear energy development programs to mitigate potential 
disasters caused by human factors (French et al., 2011). Over the years, HRA methods 
have evolved with increasing levels of dimensions where they are classified as either first 
generation, second generation, or even third generation HRA methods (Boring, 2007; 
French et al., 2011). There is not a consensus on what constitutes an HRA method being 




generation models as assessing human error via simple event tree analysis and focusing 
on omission—failure to respond to events appropriately.  
Second generation models more generally have the features of cognition, context, 
commission, and chronology (Boring, 2007). Cognition adds the element of cognitive 
psychological aspects to factors influencing performance (i.e. PIFs). Context recognizes 
the time and space in which the human made the error. As opposed to omission defined 
above, commission refers to inappropriate human actions. Chronology refers to the later 
released HRA methods. Still though, there is overlap between HRA methods, thereby 
classifying some methods as 1.5th generation (Boring, 2007).  
First and second generation HRA methods are static in nature—capturing human 
performance a specific point in time (Boring, 2007). Third generation methods explain 
how a change in one PIF affects other PIFs and the eventual event progression. These 
newer methods also consider dynamic progression—PIFs may change throughout the 
course of an event, for example, fatigue may increase throughout an eight-hour workday 
(Boring, 2007). Additionally, a dynamic initiator is when a sudden change in the scenario 
affects the PIFs.  
As the HRA methods have evolved, so have the complexities of PIFs and the 
understanding of PIFs on human performance. In the cybersecurity context, this is 
apparent in how cybersecurity researchers think about the context that cognitive factors 
influence inappropriate human actions (commission). Additionally, dynamic CS-PIFs that 
evolve over time (dynamic progression; e.g. fatigue over course of the day), and changes 




emotion) are other dimensions to consider. In the next section, performance influencing 
factors will be examined. A brief human error literature summary is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Summary of Human Error Literature 
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Performance Influencing Factors 
In the discipline of human reliability—there have been numerous Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA) methods developed with intentions to understand and mitigate causes of 
human error in safety systems. Within HRA, Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) 
(also previously called Performance Shaping Factors (PSF)) are the variables that affect 
human performance leading to human error (Franciosi et al., 2019; Groth, 2009; Holland 




factors (Boring et al., 2007; Franciosi et al., 2019). Internal PIF examples include stress, 
education, and experience; external PSF examples include environmental factors (e.g. 
temperature, noise), management, and procedures (Boring et al., 2007; Franciosi et al., 
2019). When categorizing or measuring PIFs, it is important for reliability and validity to 
distinguish between direct and indirect PIFs: direct PIFs can be measured directly and 
indirect PSFs cannot be measured directly—where the magnitude of the PSF can only be 
determined subjectively (Alavi et al., 2016; Boring et al., 2007).  
As discussed in previous sections, human error is problematic in creating 
vulnerabilities that lead to data breaches. Scholars and practitioners often point at the 
“human element” as the largest threat to cybersecurity (Goode et al., 2018; Evans et al., 
2019; Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011; Schultz, 2005). Not often, is the cybersecurity 
“human element” examined with the scrutiny and detail that is seen in safety-related 
human reliability analysis methods (Evans et al., 2019). More common though, are that 
the human element constructs that attribute to cybersecurity lapses examined in isolation.  
Additionally, several researchers have identified that several factors work together to 
affect the chance of human error; for example, Dekker (2006), using the local rationality 
principle stated that people do reasonable things given their goals (i.e. motivation), 
knowledge (i.e. experience), and focus of attention (i.e. awareness). Carlton and Levy 
(2017) alternatively attributed higher levels of knowledge, skills, and abilities to lower 
levels of human error. Security policies, SETA and computer monitoring directly 
influences user perceptions of sanctions, which in turn affect IS misuse intention (D’Arcy 
et al., 2009). Siponen (2000) described that “performance depends on ability, motivation, 




training, failure to follow security procedures, carelessness, lack of supervision, and the 
lack of concentration were contributors to cybersecurity human error (Ahmed et al., 
2012; Pollini et al., 2021). Carayon and Smith (2000) developed the Balance Theory, 
integrating various bodies of literature to understand the design of work factors that affect 
individual’s human performance (Pollini et al., 2021).  
Although not referred to as performance influencing factors in the cybersecurity 
literature, many of the same PIFs in safety contexts exist in cybersecurity contexts. For 
example, the Integrated Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS) HRA method lists the 
following as common high-level PIFs in HRA methods: time available, task complexity, 
workload, Human-System Interfaces (HSIs), procedures, training/knowledge, experience, 
work process, stress, and fatigue (fitness-for-duty) (Xing et al., 2017). In the SPAR-H 
HRA Method, eight PIFs were identified, and their combination in influencing human 
error was explored (Gertman et al., 2005).  
In the next few sections, major PIFs that are common among both contexts will be 
reviewed. This is not an exhaustive literature review for each PIF, as each construct could 
possibly warrant their own dissertation. Instead, the literature review on PIFs provides an 
overview of each construct, the subconstructs, and observed interdependencies with other 
constructs to influence human performance and human error in cybersecurity contexts. 
Specifically, six PIFs will be examined: Organizational Cybersecurity; Cybersecurity 
Policy and Procedures; Cybersecurity Education, Training, and Awareness; Ergonomics, 
Cybersecurity Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities; and Employee Cybersecurity Fitness for 






Summary of Performance Influencing Factors Literature 
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Organizational cybersecurity is a high-level CS-PIF that includes cybersecurity culture 
and organizational control. In a quantitative study, Friedlander and Evans (1997) found 
that culture explained 30% of safety human error among three electric company cases. 
Deal and Kennedy (1982) described culture as the most important factor in deciding the 
success of an organization. Culture is a unit that resides in individuals and is also a force 
that drives individuals’ behavior inside and outside of an organization (Schein, 2009). 
Cultures are inherent within each social group, family, community, organization and 
country, and each member of a unit is affected by and affects the culture thereby acting as 
both a member and leader simultaneously (Schein, 2009). Schein (2009) defined culture 
as:  
a pattern of shared tacit assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (p. 27) 
Schein (2009) cautioned against trying to understand culture by oversimplifying it—
“the way we do things around here” and “our basic values” are manifestations of culture; 
culture actually is better understood as existing at three levels: Artifacts, Espoused 
Values, and Underlying Assumptions (Curado et al., 2021; Schein, 2009). The 
description and relationship of the three levels of culture is shown in Figure 8. Provided 
that culture is encapsulated in several levels—culture has profound implications of being 
stable and difficult to change (Schein, 2009). Understanding the underlying concepts of 
culture will allow us to better understand the cybersecurity subculture (Huang & 




cybersecurity subcultures—consisting of various groups of employees differentiated by 
geographical location, job level, generation group, gender, or religion (da Veiga & 
Martins, 2017). Da Veiga (2016) defined cybersecurity culture as “the intentional and 
unintentional manner in which cyberspace is utilized from an international, national, 
organizational or individual perspective in the context of the attitudes, assumptions, 
beliefs, values, and knowledge of the cyber user” (p. 1008).  
 
Figure 8: The Three Levels of Culture. Adapted from Schein (2009) 
Vroom and von Solms (2004) applied Schein’s three levels of culture to cybersecurity. 
They categorized locked doors as an example of an artifact, senior executive 
cybersecurity policy as an example of espoused values, and at the subconscious 
individual level—the “underlying beliefs and values of the people in the company” as 
underlying assumptions (Vroom & von Solms, 2004, p. 196). Security culture can have a 
profound effect on the security of the organization as it ties into all aspects of the 
organization (Reegård et al., 2019; Vroom & von Solms, 2004).  
The layers in Schein’s culture taxonomy also affect the layer above or below it, as 




















von Solms (2004): “Shared knowledge of the information security policies and an 
underlying belief in the importance of information security would result in a change in 
behaviour of individuals and eventually in the organization as a whole” (p. 196). There 
are dependencies between the organization and the individual on shaping the culture: the 
organization shapes the individual and the individual shapes the organization.  
Organizational Control 
Organizational control is a factor involved with directing and motivating individuals to 
comply with organizational objectives (Boss et al., 2009; Reegård et al., 2019). Behavior 
control is when managers specify how they would like employees to behave and 
rewarding them when they comply; outcome control is when targets are articulated to 
employees and employees are rewarded when the target is achieved. Clan control is when 
managers and employees have shared values and norms, and behave with such values and 
norms.  
Technical controls alone do not achieve security—management involvement with 
creating and enforcing security policies is also necessary (Stewart & Jürjens, 2017). 
Employees are sometimes resistant to complying with security policies—when this 
happens, security fails. Employee’s perception of mandatory enforcement and 
management oversight is effective in complying with security policies. Boss et al. (2009) 
examined what factors affect the perception of mandatoriness and how does 
mandatoriness affect compliance behavior. Boss et al. (2009) defined mandatoriness as 
“the degree to which individuals perceive that compliance with existing security policies 




Controls are implemented in organizations to motivate individuals to comply with 
desired behavior (Li et al., 2019). When management implements a control, it is implied 
that compliance is required—otherwise, management would not have communicated the 
control. Boss et al. (2009) found that specification and evaluation are critical aspects of 
exercising control attributing to individual perceptions of mandatoriness. Specification is 
the communication of controls through formal documented policies and procedures and 
evaluation is the oversight or verification that employees are complying with prescribed 
policies and procedures. The perceived mandatoriness also contributes to security 
precautions taken. 
Organizational Cybersecurity CS-PIF Interaction 
Alnatheer et al. (2012) developed an information security measurement model to 
distinguish which factors influence security culture and which factors constitute security 
culture. Through eight qualitative interviews with information security experts from 
various organizations and industries, they discovered that top management involvement 
in information security, information security policy enforcement, and security training 
drive security culture. Others argue that top management involvement in information 
security are both a component and influencer of information security culture (Gcaza & 
von Solms, 2017; Thomson & von Solms, 2005). Additionally, information security 
management protects information assets and reduces risks with technology and 
management processes (Chang & Lin, 2007; Reegård et al., 2019) 
Alnatheer et al. (2012) found that collective security awareness and security 
ownership were reflections for security culture. The security awareness in this context is 




aware, ideally committed to, of their security mission” (Siponen, 2000, p. 31), as opposed 
to the security awareness in SETA—which is in the perspective of the organization 
providing the awareness. Alnatheer et al. (2012) also described regarding security 
ownership, “it is important for staff in any organisation to understand their security roles 
and responsibilities, in order to enhance their security performance and thus the 
organisation’s security performance” (p. 5).  
Culture’s influence on human performance is apparent in safety (Friedlander & Evans, 
1997) and security (Gcaza et al., 2017; Vroom & von Solms, 2004) disciplines (Reegård 
et al., 2019). Culture is a reflection and impacts all aspects of an organization: shared 
knowledge of information security policies and attitudes towards information security 
(Reegård et al., 2019; Vroom & von Solms, 2004); motivation and compliance, SETA, 
policies and procedures (Boss et al., 2009; Gcaza & von Solms, 2017); collective security 
awareness and security ownership (Alnatheer et al., 2012); fitness for duty (Gertman et 
al., 2005; Pollini et al., 2021); and behavior (Schein, 2009). Culture has been recognized 
as an organizational-based PIF (Whaley et al., 2016). A brief organizational cybersecurity 
literature summary is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Summary of Organizational Cybersecurity Literature 
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Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures 
Definition 
Policies and procedures work in tandem to guide behaviors in an organization 
(Reegård et al., 2019; von Solms & von Solms, 2004). Policies communicate guidance 
and procedures for employees to comply with to meet the wishes of management, and 
procedures provide how employees should comply from a procedural perspective 
(Reegård et al., 2019; von Solms & von Solms). Policies and procedures are related; for 
example, procedures to properly discard anything with sensitive information may prevent 
a hard copy data breach, but a policy must require for it to be enforced (Verizon, 2017).  
Vroom and von Solms (2004) defined information security policies as “the processes 
and procedures that the employee should adhere to in order to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information and other valuable assets” (p. 192). In other 
words, a policy is a medium for management to communicate messages to employees 
(Reegård et al., 2019; von Solms & von Solms, 2004). In the case of an information 
security policy, management communicate and dictate on how employees should behave 
with respect to information security. It provides the organization with a strategy and 
defines the working culture and expected behaviors of employees (Buckley et al., 2014).  
Cram et al. (2017) described three levels of security policies. The enterprise 
information security policy, also known as the security program policy, is the highest-
level security policy that defines strategic direction, scope, and tone for the organization’s 
security efforts (Cram et al., 2017). Issue-specific security policies operate at one level 
below, and address specific technologies such as e-mail, use of personal electronic 




level of policies are technical security policies that define user-facing, but define the 
configuration or maintenance of a system (Cram et al., 2017). The issue-specific security 
policy level more directly affects employees and user, as the enterprise information 
security policy is more philosophical, and the technical security policies is more aligned 
with computer security (Cram et al., 2017).   
Information security policies provide acceptable use expectations to the users, and is 
related to the security culture and security awareness campaigns within the organization 
(Buckley et al., 2014; Cram et al., 2017). Not only must a policy be created and 
implemented, but it must also be meaningful, communicated effectively, and be 
understood, for the policy to be successful (Buckley et al., 2014; Cram et al., 2017; 
Vroom & von Solms, 2004).  
Although there are insider threats that have malicious motives, many simply choose to 
ignore security policies (Gcaza et al., 2017; Herath & Rao, 2009; Zimmermann & 
Renaud, 2019). They may rationalize their violations and unknowingly (and mistakenly) 
create vulnerabilities. Barlow et al. (2013) provided the following example: “employees 
may choose to share a network password because they rationalize that no one is being 
injured as a result of their actions. These rationalizations cause even non-malicious 
employees to knowingly violate security policies” (p. 2). The mere existence and 
promulgation of IS Security Policies is not enough—employees must also comply with 
the policies (Gcaza et al., 2017; Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Compliance 
There are numerous studies that attempt to explain why users do and do not comply 




Lowry, 2019; Herath & Rao, 2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Vance et al., 2020). 
Attitude, normative beliefs (culture), and habits have a significant effect on intention to 
comply with information security policies, but more importantly, the quality of the 
information within the policies has a significant effect on the actual compliance (D’Arcy 
& Lowry, 2019; Pahnila et al., 2007). The substance of what is in the policy is important. 
For example, D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that a user’s perceived severity of sanction 
(written in policy) has a direct negative effect on IS misuse intention. Policies can also 
address both intentional and unintentional insider threats—with topics such as integration 
and deterrence for intentional threats, and motivation, training, ergonomics, pressure, 
workload, and awareness for unintentional insider threats (Reegård et al., 2019; Yayla, 
2011).  
Siponen and Vance (2010) provided supplementing theories on why employees 
comply (or don’t comply) with information security policies: general deterrence theory 
and neutralization theory. The criminological theory of general deterrence focuses on 
disincentives or sanctions to dissuade policy non-compliance (and persuade towards 
policy compliance), with two subconstructs: “(1) certainty of sanction and (2) severity of 
sanction” (Straub, 1990, p. 258). Neutralization theory suggest that persons rationalize 
their violative behaviors; an example Siponen and Vance (2010) provided: “a person 
performing a deviant action justifies his/her behavior by claiming that no damage will 
really be done. In this way, the person avoids guilt by reasoning that there is no criminal 
behavior involved; after all, no one got hurt” (p. 489). In this research, what’s important 
to realize is that policies must be communicated so that users may understand the 




place (Barlow et al., 2013). Other predictive factors for user intention to violate IS 
security policies are shame, moral beliefs and perceived benefits (Vance & Siponen, 
2012). Moody et al. (2018) proposed a unified model of 11 theories, to explain security 
policy compliance.  
Security policies alone do not directly reduce the occurrence or severity of security 
breaches, to include those caused by human error (Pollini et al., 2021). It is speculated 
that security policies, along with other factors—security culture compatibility, awareness 
programs, enforcement—work together to improve human performance and mitigate 
human error (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Enrici et al., 2010; Reegård et al., 2019). In 
summary, cybersecurity policies and procedures direct management’s strategy (culture) 
and execution, but to be effective, they must be communicated (SETA). The importance 
of policies and procedures are also observed in HRA methods (Forester et al., 2006; 
Swain & Guttmann, 1983). A brief policies and procedures literature summary is shown 
in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Summary of Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures Literature 
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Cybersecurity Education, Training, and Awareness 
Definition 
Education, training, and awareness are three separate, but complementary functions 




go to medical school to formally learn about their trade (education), but in many 
countries, they must also complete “rotations”—training—to practice medicine. 
Alternatively, airline pilots must complete a requisite number of flight training hours 
before getting their license, and the airlines that hire them may provide awareness 
programs to notify of recent airline mishaps (Shappell et al., 2007), to increase awareness 
and reduce complacency. Consider the education and training required to get a driver’s 
license, and the flashing LED signs on the highway that alert drivers to “slow down” 
when it’s raining, or when a traffic delay is imminent.  
Education, training, and awareness in security contexts serve similar purposes. The 
mere existence of effective security policies and procedures serve no purpose if they are 
not communicated to users (Alshboul & Streff, 2017). SETA programs are designed to 
educate, train and make employees aware of the organizational requirements. Quality 
Cybersecurity Education, Training, and Awareness (CETA) programs “raise employee 
awareness of responsibilities in relation to their organizations’ information assets, 
provide instruction on the consequences of abuse, and develop the necessary foundational 
cybersecurity skills to help fulfill these requirements” (Goode et al., 2018, p. 70). Table 6 
(adapted from Caballero, 2009, p. 249) provides high-level differences between the three.  
Table 6 
Matrix of security teaching methods and measures that can be implemented 
 Awareness Training Education 
Attribute: “What” “How” “Why” 
 
Level: Information Knowledge Insight 
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Impact Timeframe Short-term Intermediate Long-term 
 
Cybersecurity Education 
Using socio-technical philosophies, it is important to address the “why” in 
cybersecurity education, on why certain policies and procedures are in place in order to 
increase user motivation and compliance (Goode et al., 2018; Siponen, 2000). Persuasion 
techniques are recommended so that listeners can internalize the principles (Siponen, 
2000). Cybersecurity education programs are more structured in nature and will impact 
users for a longer period (Caballero, 2009).   
Cybersecurity Training 
Training in organizations has been shown to improve competitiveness, motivation, 
creativity, and attitude (Bernardino & Curado, 2020). It has also been shown to improve 
knowledge, skills, and long-term performance; although small to medium sized 
enterprises find it more difficult to offer training activities with their limited resources 
(Caballero, 2009; Curado & Sousa, 2021). In safety, the Federal Railroad Administration 
imposed requirements that require railroad companies to maintain training programs that 




Professionals, 2012); the same can be true of security. Non-malicious insider threats can 
be minimized through employee cybersecurity training (Hua & Bapna, 2013; Huang & 
Pearlson, 2019) by improving compliance behavior (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010) and 
skills (Siponen, 2000). 
Additionally, cybersecurity training with lessons learned of prior errors may help 
future users from committing the same errors (Dormann & Frese, 1994; Huang & 
Pearlson, 2019). In psychophysiological experimentation, Holroyd and Coles (2002) 
reaffirmed reinforcement learning where actions producing positive feelings are likely to 
be occur again in the future, and actions producing negative feelings (e.g. errors) are less 
likely to occur again. This is more ideally realized in cybersecurity training scenarios, 
such as embedded training email systems used to train users to recognize and avoid email 
phishing attacks (Kumaraguru et al., 2007).  
Cybersecurity Awareness 
Cybersecurity awareness programs reinforce the “what” and are short term reminders 
to cybersecurity compliance (Caballero, 2009). Social psychological techniques can be 
implemented in cybersecurity awareness programs to modify attitudes and consequently, 
behaviors (Pollini et al., 2021; Thomson & von Solms, 1998). The specifics of techniques 
are beyond the scope of this dissertation; it is important to note that the quality of the 
cybersecurity awareness program is important for the individual to receive and comply 
with the message.  
CETA by and large is important for cybersecurity human performance, but is also tied 
to other aspects. Reegård et al. (2019) (and von Solms & von Solms, 2004) tied the 




been found to positively influence cybersecurity culture (da Veiga & Martins, 2015). 
CETA has also been attributed to changes in Information Security (IS) knowledge, IS 
attitude, IS normative beliefs, IS intention, and ultimately IS behaviors (Khan et al., 
2011; Huang & Pearlson, 2019). Cybersecurity training improves knowledge and skills, 
motivates personnel, and improves attitudes (Rouse, 1985). Finally, Siponen (2000) ties 
cybersecurity education to motivation, cybersecurity training to skills, and cybersecurity 
awareness programs to increased cybersecurity awareness, which aligns well with the 
constructs of CETA to the constructs of competency (see Figure 9). A brief CETA 
literature summary is shown in Table 7. 










Figure 9: CETA to Competency Relationship 
Table 7 
Summary of Cybersecurity Education, Training, and Awareness Literature 
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Cybersecurity Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities 
Definition 
In this research, Cybersecurity Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (CKSA) will be used 
to encompass the various terms to describe how well a user is equipped to perform. Some 
of the terms described herein are awareness, skill, and self-efficacy. These attributes are 
developed through osmosis with the cybersecurity culture, via CETA programs and the 
cybersecurity policy doctrines, or the user may have developed in previous organizations 
or contexts. These terms are relatively static in nature—developed over time. Personal 
norms and attitude—internalized factors lasting months to years—are included in this 




(2016) defined personal norms as “the employees’ values and views on information 
security compliance with organizational policies” (p. 5) and attitude as an individual’s 
“positive or negative feeling towards engaging in specific behavior” (p. 5).  
Employee Cybersecurity Awareness 
Information security awareness, Information Security Policy (ISP) awareness, 
cybersecurity countermeasures awareness, and other terms, have been used to define how 
well a user responds in cybersecurity contexts. Wiley et al. (2020) defined information 
security awareness as “the extent to which employees understand the significance of their 
organisation’s information security policies, rules, and guidelines, and the extent to which 
they behave in accordance with these policies, rules and guidelines (p. 2). Siponen (2000) 
explicitly described that awareness reduces human error. In addition, there is also ISP 
awareness, which is the level of awareness of organizational security policies and 
procedures (Alshboul & Streff, 2017). Cybersecurity countermeasures awareness is the 
“employee awareness of security policies, SETA programs, computer monitoring, and 
computer sanctions” (Goode et al., 2018, p. 69). Information security awareness and ISP 
awareness are both seen to affect employee behavior (Alshboul & Streff, 2017; Enrici et 
al., 2010).  
Employee Cybersecurity Skill and Employee Cybersecurity Competency 
Employee Cybersecurity Skill is the “combination of abilities, knowledge, and 
experience that enables an individual to complete a task well” (Carlton & Levy, 2017, p. 
17). Over time, this skill transitions into competency (Carlton & Levy). Developing skill 
begins with (1) declarative knowledge (i.e. initial skill acquisition), followed by (2) 




autonomous (i.e. executing the ability autonomously) (Anderson, 1982; Carlton & Levy). 
The three-step incremental process (Anderson; Carlton & Levy) appears compatible with 
Rasmussen’s (1983) SRK human performance framework (see Figure 10); Marcolin et al. 
(2000) described competency as an antecedent to performance. Information security 
experience is the “familiarity with information security incidents, skills and the ability to 
prevent, manage, and mitigate the risk of information security events” (Safa et al., 2016, 
p. 4). General computer and internet experience have been shown to improve self-
efficacy in information security (Rhee et al. 2009).  
 
Figure 10: Competency Development and Human Performance Levels Comparison 
Cybersecurity Self-Efficacy  
An important construct of social cognitive theory, cybersecurity self-efficacy is a form 
of self-evaluation that is an antecedent to behavior (Rhee et al. 2009). Individuals with 
high levels of self-efficacy have stronger convictions to utilize their motivation and 
cognitive resources to likely increase cyber resilience (Huang & Pearlson, 2019). 
Following the identification that the context of self-efficacy is important (Agarwal et al., 




systems have emerged. Computer self-efficacy is an individual’s conviction of their 
ability to use a computer (Rhee et al., 2009). Self-Efficacy in Information Security (SEIS) 
is the belief in one’s ability to protect information and information systems from 
“unauthorized disclosure, modification, loss, destruction, and lack of availability” (Rhee 
et al., 2009, p. 818); SEIS contributes to stronger cybersecurity conscious behaviors 
(Enrici et al., 2010; Huang & Pearlson, 2019). 
Awareness, skill, and self-efficacy individually affect performance. Choi et al. (2013) 
examined Cybersecurity Skills (CS), Computer Self-Efficacy (CSE), and Cybersecurity 
Countermeasures Awareness (CCA) and their relationship to computer misuse intention. 
Surveying 185 US government employees in the US Northwest, their findings indicated 
that CS, CSE, and CCA directly or indirectly influenced the user’s intention to misuse 
information systems (Choi et al., 2013). With respect to disregard to information security 
policies, competency is a key factor in determining violations. Interesting to note, is that 
PIFs within CKSA interact to influence performance and intentions (Choi et al., 2013), 
but also can interact with other PIFs such as fitness for duty to influence performance 
(Baxter & Bass, 1998; Wiley et al., 2020). A brief CKSA literature summary is shown in 
Table 8. 
Table 8 
Summary of Cybersecurity Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Literature 
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Employee Cybersecurity Fitness for Duty 
Definition 
The human mind is extremely complex—and every mind is different, with infinite 
perspectives, emotions, assumptions, and motivations. Additionally, the numerous 
variables that influence the mind can change from moment to moment, and can affect 
every individual differently. This PIF—Employee Cybersecurity Fitness for Duty 
(CFFD)—is a dynamic state which involves the numerous cognitive, behavioral, and 
physiological factors that may compose a human’s state of mind and state of being. 
CFFD can be defined as “whether or not the individual performing the task is physically 
and mentally fit to perform the task at the time” (Gertman et al., 2005, p. 25). Fitness for 
duty and related PIFs have a strong presence in safety contexts; in this research, we will 





Specified in safety contexts explicitly and often, stress is one of the more important 
factors contributing to performance (Swain & Guttman, 1983; Xing et al., 2017); stress is 
the human response to a stressor, and “psychological and physiological stresses result 
from a work environment in which the demands placed on the operator by the system do 
not conform to his capabilities and limitations” (Swain & Guttman, 1983, p. 2-5). There 
should be an optimum level of stress—with too much stress being disruptive, and too 
little stress leading to insufficient arousal to stay alert (Swain & Guttman, 1983). Stress’ 
role as a contributor to human performance and human error is not as prevalent in 
cybersecurity contexts—even the literature that focuses on psychological components 
(Enrici et al., 2010; Pollini et al., 2021; Schultz, 2005). Stress is identified as a factor in 
certain cybersecurity contexts—such as the medical industry (Liginlal et al., 2009). 
Liginlal et al. (2009) also include fatigue in this context.   
Fatigue 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2018) reported that 795 deaths 
in the US were a result from drowsy-driving-related crashes in 2017. In organizational 
contexts, fatigue is an important factor contributing to human error, being closely tied to 
human factors engineering and ergonomics (Liu & Guo, 2016). Organizations that 
require individuals to work unusually long hours may cause fatigued workers (Swain & 
Guttmann, 1983). Additionally, physically or cognitively demanding tasks may 
contribute to fatigue (Gertman et al., 2005; Paul & Dykstra, 2017). Heightened stress and 




2016). Fatigue can also result in the failure to follow policies and procedures (Luciano et 
al., 2010).  
Situation Awareness 
Endsley (1995) defined situation awareness as “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and 
the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 36). Situation awareness is a state of 
knowledge, pertaining only to the state of a dynamic environment (Endsley, 1995). 
Situation Awareness (SA) directly affects task performance (Baxter & Bass, 1998) and 
decision making (Endsley, 2015). In cybersecurity contexts, the design of human-
computer interface is important to ensure that high levels of sustained situation awareness 
are not required, as it could lead to human errors (Boyce et al., 2011; Pollini et al., 2021).  
Emotion 
Emotion is phenomena of feelings, behaviors and bodily reactions aroused by external 
events, and the reactions to those events (Cairns et al., 2014). A two-dimension construct 
consisting of valence (either positive or negative) and the degree of emotional arousal can 
categorize an individual’s emotional state; emotion is known to affect a person’s 
thinking: positive emotions enhance decision making whereas negative emotions impairs 
processing task efficiency (Cairns et al., 2014). A person is more likely to be make errors 
when they are emotionally upset (Swain & Guttmann, 1983).  
Motivation 
Motivation dictates the difference between what people can do (maximum 
performance) and what people will do (typical performance) (Klehe & Anderson, 2007). 




towards the achievement of a goal (Whaley et al., 2016). Skills and abilities, in 
combination with motivation, influence performance (Klehe & Anderson, 2007; Pollini et 
al., 2021).  
Fitness for duty is a dynamic state: an individual can be in an ideal state (rested, 
happy, motivated, etc.) one day delivering good performance, and the next day be in a 
problematic state (fatigued, miserable, low situation awareness, etc.), caused by personal 
or other reasons. Fitness for duty has been shown in safety contexts to directly affect 
performance. Ergonomics has been shown to improve fitness for duty. A brief CFFD 
literature summary is shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 
Summary of Employee Cybersecurity Fitness for Duty Literature 
 




























likely to make 
more number 
entry errors; 



















































































Luciano et al., 
2010 








































































In this section, the term ergonomics was chosen to describe concepts such as Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) and macroergonomics. Included in this definition is 
everything to include the environment, context, technology, supervisory and 
organizational factors that affect the user’s performance. Improved performance and 
reduced human error can be accomplished using a multidimensional lens, considering 
psychological, contextual, environmental, and technological factors (Carayon & Smith, 





In computer and cybersecurity contexts, systems were originally engineered around 
the system, without much regard to the user (system-centered design), whereas the 
successor User-Centered Design (UCD) begins with the user’s needs, abilities, and 
knowledge in mind (Renaud & Flowerday, 2017; Rizzo et al., 1996). A goal of Human-
Computer Interaction is to minimize human errors through technology design (Rizzo et 
al., 1996; Abdolrahmani et al., 2017). The Principle of Least Surprise tells engineers to 
design their applications as the user expects them (Bratus et al., 2008). Many errors can 
be attributed to misuse or improper use of technology, and interaction between human 
and technology is of critical importance to security (Enrici et al., 2010; Pollini et al., 
2021; Renaud & Flowerday, 2017). In fact, the fields of Human-Computer Interaction 
and Security (HCISEC) (Maxion & Reeder, 2005) and Human-Centered Security and 
Privacy (HCSP) (Renaud & Flowerday, 2017) have emerged to address the role users 
play in securing systems.  
Macroergonomics 
Within human factors engineering, macroergonomics is the science and practice which 
considers the physical, organizational and social contexts in which interventions are 
implemented (Carayon, 2009; Zimmerman & Renaud, 2019). Simply possessing the 
knowledge will not guarantee that the knowledge will accessible when needed—the 
context and environment are critical factors (Pollini et al., 2021; Rizzo et al., 1996). Poor 
psychosocial work factors (e.g. workload and job control), poor physical work factors 
(e.g. workplace layout, noise, and lighting), and unsuitable cognitive work factors (e.g. 
cognitive demands) may influence job stressors (Carayon, 2009; Carayon & Smith, 2000; 




As described previously, context matters. Ergonomics may appear insignificant to 
human performance in typical office environments with typical operating systems and 
applications. In some environments or contexts though, ergonomics may be more 
significant. For example, novel software may be developed in a way that may cause users 
to leave sensitive file unsecured more often. Other situations may require users to work 
dangerously long hours or increased workload, causing diminished performance. A brief 
ergonomics literature summary is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Summary of Ergonomics Literature 
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Carayon and Smith (2000)’s Balance Theory of Job Design has five elements that 
interact to produce a stress load. These five elements are the environment, the task, 
technologies, organizational factors, and the individual. The interactions of the elements 
create physical and psychological stressors, such as fatigue, decision-making, emotion, 
and motivation. If sustained, these stressors can be detrimental to health, safety, and 
performance (Carayon & Smith, 2000). Inversely, these factors can also produce positive 
outcomes, such as motivation and increased performance (Pollini et al., 2021). At the root 
of the Balance Theory concept is that all elements must be considered to improve 
performance, health and safety (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Pollini et al., 2021; Rouse, 






























Personality, physical health status, 
skills/abilities, physical conditioning, 
prior experiences and learning, 
motives, goals and needs
Task:
Job demands (workload, work pressure, 




Lack of skills to use technology leads to 
poor motivation, stress, and diminished 
performance
Environment: 
Noise, lighting, temperature, air quality, 
and work place layout
Organizational Factors:
Organizational support such as training
 
Figure 11: Balance Theory of Job Design on Performance. Adapted from Carayon and 
Smith (2000) 
 
Summary of What is Known and Unknown in the Research Literature 
This literature review examined three major topics: data breaches, human error, and 
performance influencing factors. In the Data Breaches section, context is provided to 
further establish relevance and significance of the research problem. In the Human Error 
section, further details of human performance and human error is uncovered, as found in 




The Performance Influencing Factors section goes in depth on PIFs identified to be 
present in cybersecurity contexts. Literature from the cybersecurity, management, safety, 
sociology, and psychology fields were utilized to provide a comprehensive look at factors 
that influence human performance. Six higher-order CS-PIFs were reviewed: 
organizational cybersecurity; cybersecurity policy and procedures; cybersecurity 
education, training, and awareness; cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and abilities; 
employee cybersecurity fitness for duty; and ergonomics. First-order CS-PIFs were 
uncovered in research goal one, and the second-order (higher-order) sets were validated 
in research goal two.  
Although cybersecurity human error has been identified as problematic in the 
cybersecurity literature (Evans et al., 2019; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Liginlal et al., 
2009; Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019) and data breach reports (Ponemon Institute, 2021; 
Verizon, 2021), what was missing (i.e. unknown) in the cybersecurity literature is that 
there are underlying factors and causes for human error. Much more so, is that a 
comprehensive CS-PIF list was non-existent. Additionally, what was also unknown was 
the realization that the combination of CS-PIFs may interact to cause human error, and 








Overview of Research Design 
This research was based on an interpretive philosophy—assumed that human-error 
caused data breaches are context specific, and multiple factors may combine or interact to 
lead to human error. Additionally, this research approach was inductive—it provided a 
holistically novel evaluation of factors that led to cybersecurity human errors resulting in 
real world data breaches (Pappas & Woodside, 2021). This research study examined case 
studies (data breaches), and qualitatively extrapolated data for analysis, and used fsQCA 
as the data method.  
This study was comparative research using fsQCA. The research design comprised of 
two phases. The first phase was Instrument Development, which involved CS-PIF 
Identification (RQ1) and CS-PIF Validation (RQ2). The second phase was Fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis: fsQCA Application (RQ3), and for alternative 
configurations, analyzed the type of breach (RQ4) and organization breached (RQ5) (see 




Formulation of Research Questions
Exploration of Literature
fsQCA Results



































Figure 12: Research Design for Empirical Investigation Using Fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) 
 
Phase 1: Instrument Development 
In this research, two sets of constructs were measured: conditions and outcomes. As 
illustrated in Figure 2 (GEMC-DBF) previously, the conditions are the CS-PIFs—the 
factors that can influence human performance, and the outcome is the type of CS-HE 
(SBE, RBM, or KBM). The CS-HE types are identified and established—as developed in 
the psychological literature by Reason (1990). PIFs in cybersecurity contexts (CS-PIF) on 
the other hand, had yet to be holistically identified and validated in research. PIFs in 
safety contexts have varying range (i.e. count) per application with as few as one, with 
over 50 PIFs, or even applications with undefined amounts (Boring, 2010). Therefore, it 




2019). The Instrument Development process is illustrated in Figure 13 and explained in 
further detail next.  
 
Figure 13: Instrument Development for Cybersecurity Performance Influencing 
Factors 
CS-PIF Identification  
This research developed a baseline of CS-PIFs using data triangulation: (1) by 
identifying and compiling causes of human error in the cybersecurity literature, (2) 
compiling PIFs from the safety literature, and (3) compiling PIFs from the actual data 
breach cases derived from PRC database. Data triangulation leverages the strength of one 
method on the others, and provides a more comprehensive understanding of a 
phenomenon of interest (Fusch et al., 2018; Sands & Roer-Strier, 2006). The three 
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used—using the Delphi technique—to identify the most common CS-PIFs. The Delphi 
technique is further described below.  
CS-PIF Validation 
The identified CS-PIFs were consolidated into higher-order CS-PIFs, and validated by 
SMEs, also using another phase of the Delphi technique. With regard to selecting causal 
conditions (in this case, CS-PIFs) for fsQCA—it was prudent to minimize the number of 
conditions selected for exploration within the cases (Douglas et al., 2020). The greater the 
number of conditions, the greater the possibility that each case will be unique in the 
condition configuration (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994; Douglas et al., 2020; Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2010). Marx et al.’s (2013) analysis of QCA studies found that the number 
of conditions range from two to 10, with most using only four to five conditions.  
Expert Panel 
It has been demonstrated previously that an analyst’s subjective interpretation of 
human error in HRA has proven problematic as they may fail to take adequate 
consideration of the context, and different analysts may provide different results (Stanton, 
2009). To account for this deficiency, 31 cybersecurity SMEs were used to provide 
feedback. The Delphi technique was used to utilize an expert panel to review the 
redundant-free PIF list and identify PIFs that could cause human error that could 
potentially lead to data breaches. The recruitment email used is presented in Appendix A. 
The Delphi technique, also called Delphi methodology and Delphi method is 
appropriate when accurate information is unavailable and opinionated but informed input 
is important (Goode et al., 2018; Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). It is designed to encourage 




feedback” (Goode et al., 2018, p. 71). Similar to a peer review, the Delphi technique 
obtains a representative view by involving as many experts in the field as possible to 
provide feedback (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). Cybersecurity SMEs were used as experts. 
Best practice suggests 15 to 30 cybersecurity professionals with various backgrounds, 
age, and education; consensus range from 55%-100%, with 70% as the standard (Goode 
et al., 2018).  
Phase 2: Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Overview 
fsQCA is a type of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 2008). QCA is a 
formal comparative case-oriented research method and collection of techniques used to 
understand how different conditions combine to generate an outcome (Marx et al., 2013). 
QCA was introduced in 1987 by sociologist Charles Ragin for the social sciences and has 
spread across disciplines (Thomann & Maggetti, 2017).  
The original version of QCA–Crisp-Set QCA (csQCA)–combines strengths of 
qualitative and quantitative methods, based on set theory and Boolean algebra (Marx et 
al., 2013; Pappas & Woodside, 2021). csQCA uses Boolean values–0 and 1–to assign set 
membership values for conditions and outcomes. Many conditions and outcomes, 
however, vary by level of degree of membership. The fuzzy-set theory is a mathematical 
system that allows partial membership in sets (Ragin, 2009; Zadeh, 1965). fsQCA was 
developed to address the deficiencies and, thus, a complement to csQCA as it allows 
partial membership based on fuzzy set calibration criteria established by the researcher 
(Ragin, 2009). Calibration is “the process of classifying conditions in each case from full 




fsQCA is useful for data exploration, synthesis, and typology building, by 
summarizing data and interpreting cases into a truth table of set relations (Marx et al., 
2013). Therefore, fsQCA systematically integrates within-case and cross-case analysis 
(Marx et al., 2013). fsQCA is conjunctural in its logic and examines set relations for 
logical implications or hypotheses of necessary and sufficient conditions leading to 
outcomes (Balle et al., 2018; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010; Thomann & Maggetti, 
2017). A necessary condition is present in all instances of an outcome; a sufficient 
condition by itself can produce the outcome (Marx et al., 2013; Ragin, 1999; Thomann & 
Maggetti, 2017). It must be noted that fsQCA is appropriate for detecting these types of 
set relations, but inadequate for detecting correlations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).  
fsQCA has three aspects of causal complexity: conjunctural causation, equifinality, 
and causal asymmetry (Douglas et al., 2020; Pappas & Woodside, 2021). Conjunctural 
causation refers to the single conditions quite possibly not resulting in an outcome unless 
combined with other specific conditions, i.e. the “Swiss cheese model” (Thomann & 
Maggetti, 2017). Equifinality allows for different, mutually exclusive causal 
configurations leading to the same phenomenon (Thomann & Maggetti, 2017). Causal 
asymmetry refers to “the conditions explaining the occurrence of an outcome can differ 
from those explaining its nonoccurrence” (Thomann & Maggetti, 2017, p. 5). In addition, 
QCA rejects permanent causality as is seen in traditional statistical techniques, since 
QCA views causation as conjuncture and context specific (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009).  
Process 
This research used fsQCA to evaluate the conjunctural causal relationship of CS-PIFs 




examined, and the conditions (CS-PIFs) and outcomes (CS-HE) were identified for each 
case and coded based on fuzzy-set calibration (Basurto & Speer, 2012; Douglas et al., 
2020). fsQCA research design has specific requirements including case selection, 
variable specification, and set membership calibration (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). 
The raw data are then input into a data matrix, transformed into a truth table, then the 
solutions are interpreted (Thiem, 2017) (see Figure 12). 
Case Selection 
Cases of data breaches selected must have had enough information about the 
circumstances leading to the breach (the user’s erroneous actions and the characteristics 
of the user and organization) to be able to make inferences on potential CS-PIF and CS-
HE. Content analysis is a research technique to make inferences on textual data 
(Ayyagari, 2012; Gaur & Kumar, 2018). Further specification of case selection is 
presented in the Population and Sample section. fsQCA is an iterative process that 
requires the researcher to revisit cases and data—a “back-and-forth between ideas and 
evidence” (Thomann & Maggetti, 2017, p. 4). 
Variable Specification 
The variables in this research are the CS-PIFs and CS-HEs present or absent in data 
breach cases. CS-PIFs are identified in RQ1, and higher order sets used for fsQCA are 
validated in RQ2 (Douglas et al., 2020; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). CS-HEs are 
SBE, RBM, and KBM. CS-PIFs and CS-HEs must be calibrated for fsQCA. 
Set Membership Calibration 
Fuzzy set membership must be calibrated; substantive and theoretical knowledge 




and full non-membership of a set (Curado et al., 2016; Gonçalves et al., 2021). The 
scores were generated via the calibration of sets (Douglas et al., 2020; Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2010). Ragin (2009) asserted that:  
Such calibration is possible only through the use of theoretical and substantive 
knowledge, which is essential to the specification of the three qualitative breakpoints: 
full membership (1), full non-membership (0), and the crossover point, where there is 
maximum ambiguity regarding whether a case is more “in” or more “out” of a set 
(0.5). (p. 90) 
Data Matrix 
Following calibration of the variables, the cases were manually reviewed using the 
content analysis technique. Inferences were made on the presence or absence of CS-PIFs 
for each case (data breach) and coded based on set membership calibration previously 
conducted. Additionally, the human error (SBE, RBM, and KBM) leading to the breach 
was coded based on the fsQCA calibration. The raw qualitative data were interpreted and 
coded into a data matrix: a spreadsheet with one axis being the data breach case, and the 
other axis being the CS-PIFs and CS-HEs data (Thiem, 2017).  
Truth Table 
Once all cases were reviewed and coded into the data matrix, the data file could then 
be uploaded into fsQCA software for transformation into the truth table. A truth table 
lists all possible logical combinations of causal conditions and outcomes (configurations) 
relating to the cases (Kraus et al., 2017; Ragin, 2008). Establishing a consistency score 
(0.8) will ensure a cutoff to determine conjunctural relationships (causal recipes) of CS-




parsimonious, and intermediate) from the cases to provide indication of how certain 
conditions (CS-PIFs) combine to create outcomes (CS-HEs) (Santos et al., 2021).  
Interpreting Results 
The results of the fsQCA application provided data to be interpreted. The results 
answered RQ3: what are the alternative configurations of internal (individual) and 
external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to (a) skill-based errors; (b) 
rule-based mistakes; and (c) knowledge-based mistakes resulting in the largest data 
breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US? Further 
investigation into the results allowed insight how the sufficient configurations interact to 
create different data breaches (RQ4), and different organizations (RQ5). 
Reliability and Validity 
Like other empirical social research methods, QCA establishes inference by using 
known facts (theoretical and substantive knowledge) to learn new facts (Ragin, 1999; 
Thomann & Maggetti, 2017). Establishing inference is completed by achieving internal 
validity (& measurement validity), external validity, and adopting a mode of reasoning 
(Thomann & Maggetti, 2017) (see Figure 14). Theory building--mode of reasoning--was 






Figure 14: Components of Inference adapted from Thomann and Maggetti (2017) 
External Validity 
Modest generalization is achieved through the analysis of carefully selected cases 
(Thomann & Maggetti, 2017). In this research, the cases were data breaches. The data 
breaches selected were those reported on the PRC database that took place from 2007–
2019, in the US The top 100 data breaches from each organization type were examined, 
as to represent the range of industries and improve external validity (see Table 11, 
adapted from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2021). The largest data breaches were 
selected as their scope of magnitude more likely results in more media coverage and 
details in revealing the conditions and outcomes leading to the breach. Because the 






















































selected for which obtaining in-depth knowledge is crucial, relevant, and feasible for 




Internal Validity and Measurement Validity 
Familiarity with the cases before, during, and after QCA analysis was a requirement 
for improving internal validity and in-depth case knowledge (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2010; Thomann & Maggetti, 2017). Data triangulation was used to examine each data 
breach case in the PRC dataset against various data breach databases and media reports; 
confirming validity of data breach data (Ayyagari, 2012; Fusch et al., 2018). Careful set 
membership calibration in addition to SME feedback, assisted in the accurate descriptive 
and explanatory inferences for cases and concepts under observation (Thomann & 
Maggetti, 2017). Proper and confident categorization required thorough understanding of 
the subject matter—CS-HE and CS-PIFs.  
Population and Sample 
To select the cases, and to understand which causes are relevant, Ragin (1999) 
recommended substantive literature review or an in-depth analysis of cases. Additionally, 
Code Description 
BSF Businesses—Financial and Insurance Services 
BSO Businesses—Other  
BSR Businesses—Retail/Merchant—Include Online Retail 
EDU Educational Institutions 
GOV Government and Military 







fsQCA accepts purposeful sampling, that is, the researcher may select, add, or drop cases 
throughout their research, provided the cases share enough background characteristics 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This research explored publicly reported data breaches in the 
PRC database, and cross-examined with other sources (e.g. media outlets) for an 
exhaustive understanding of each breach–CS-PIFs and CS-HE (Ayyagari, 2012; Fusch et 
al., 2018).  
PRC has been used in several studies examining data breaches (Ayyagari, 2012; 
Culnan & Williams, 2009; Rosati & Lynn, 2021). As explained in a previous section, the 
top 100 data breaches from each organization type within the PRC database were selected 
for the sample, to enhance external validity and due to the publicly availability content of 
larger breaches. Of those reviewed, only a proportionate number of cases were a result of 
human error. This resulted to the final case sample size of 102–exceeding the threshold 
for large-N QCA studies as defined by Rihoux et al (2013). Rihoux et al. (2013) analyzed 
QCA journal articles from 1984 to 2011; Table 12 shows the share of small-N, medium-
N, and large-N QCA studies during this period.  
 
Table 12 
QCA Case Sample Size Share 
Size Criteria Share (percentage) 
Small-N Less than 10 cases 12% 
Medium-N 10–50 cases 60% 
Large-N More than 50 cases 28% 
 
Data Analysis 




Prior to data analysis, the data were examined and cleaned to resolve data 
irregularities (Levy, 2003). This is called pre-analysis data screening or pre-analysis data 
preparation. The first reason to do this is for data accuracy, to ensure the data scribed in 
the data matrix are accurate. This was accomplished by reviewing cases iteratively to 
ensure consistent condition and outcome scoring against the set membership calibration. 
Another reason for pre-analysis data screening is to ensure there were no missing data. 
With 800 cases reviewed, and multiple conditions and outcomes, it is imperative for 
fsQCA to use complete data to avoid inaccurate data analysis (de Block & Vis, 2019).  
Data Analysis 
There are several csQCA/fsQCA software packages with various features, algorithms, 
and outputs, used to conduct qualitative comparative analysis. The specific QCA 
software package used was fsQCA 3.1b for Windows 10, developed by Charles Ragin 
and Sean Davey (Ragin & Davey, 2017). Use of the software, required data to be inputted 
or imported in rows and columns (e.g. Excel or CSV format), with the rows representing 
the individual cases, and the columns representing the conditions and outcomes. Upon 
execution, the program outputs the solution(s) for interpretation of the results (Thiem & 
Duşa, 2013).  
Resource Requirements 
This research study obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for the 
cybersecurity SMEs that participated for CS-PIF identification and CS-PIF validation 
(See Appendix B). An online survey tool was used to collect responses from 





This chapter defined the research methodology that was used to address the research 
goals. The research methodology used consisted of two main phases. The first phase was 
instrument development—identification and validation of CS-PIFs (conditions) using an 
expert panel (Delphi technique). The second phase progressed through the fsQCA 
process: case selection, variable specification, set membership calibration, data matrix, 
truth table, and interpretation of results.  
Carefully administering the research methodology directly answered the Main 
Research Question: What is the conjunctural causal relationship, using configurational 
analysis, of internal (individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs 
leading to CS-HE that resulted in the largest data breaches across multiple organization 
types from 2007 to 2019 in the US? Additionally, the following research questions were 
answered as progressing through the two phases: 
RQ1. What are the cybersecurity SMEs’ identified most common internal 
(individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to 
CS-HE that result in data breaches? 
RQ2. What are the cybersecurity SMEs’ validated higher-order set of the most 
common internal (individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-
PIFs leading to human error that result in data breaches? 
RQ3. What are the alternative configurations of internal (individual) and external 
(organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to (a) skill-based errors; (b) 
rule-based mistakes; and (c) knowledge-based mistakes resulting in the largest 




RQ4. What alternative configurations of CS-PIFs are responsible for CS-HE leading 
to various data breaches caused by: (a) unintended disclosure; (b) system 
misconfiguration; (c) social engineering, and (d) poor cybersecurity hygiene, in 
the largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 
in the US? 
RQ5. How are the alternative configurations of CS-PIFs on CS-HE leading to the 
largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in 












This chapter covers Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Research Design (Figure 12). Phase 1 
(Instrument Development) used cybersecurity SMEs to identify 1st order CS-PIFs and 
validate 2nd order CS-PIFs, using the Delphi method. As a result, this answered Research 
Questions 1 and 2. Following Phase 1, Phase 2 (Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis) involved the processes of case selection, variable specification, set membership 
calibration, production of the truth table and interpretation of results. Eight hundred data 
breach cases were evaluated, which resulted in the positive identification of 291 data 
breaches that were caused by human error. Of those 291 cases, only 102 cases had 
enough qualitative information to transform into fuzzy-set values.  
Instrument Development (Phase 1) 
Thirty-one Cybersecurity SMEs were asked to identify the applicability of proposed 
common CS-PIFs (1st order), and to validate the appropriateness of the proposed 
categorization of higher order CS-PIFs (2nd order), using a Google Forms survey. Of the 
31 SMEs requested, 25 SMEs of various backgrounds participated in the survey, meeting 
the 15 to 30 participant target. This response accounts to an 80.6% participation rate. The 




Demographics. Section (1) and (2) have three sub-sections: (A) CS-PIF definitions are 
provided, (B) identification of 1st order CS-PIFs, and (C) validation of 2nd order CS-PIFs. 
The Survey Instrument is contained in Appendix C. Figure 15 outlines in red, Phase 1 of 
the Research Design.  
 
Figure 15: Phase 1 of the Research Design for Empirical Investigation using fsQCA 
Demographic Analysis 
Analysis of the demographic responses revealed that 76% of respondents were male, 
aligned with reported North America figures of 74% (International Information System 
Security Certification Consortium, 2020). Eighty percent of the respondents were 
between the ages of 31 and 60, with 12% below and 08% above the range. 92% of the 
respondents had at least a bachelor’s degree, with one respondent having only a high 
school diploma, and one respondent having an associate’s degree. Sixty percent of 
respondents had at least six years of cybersecurity experience, but provided the age 




technology. A majority percentage (96%) of respondents work in industry, whereas only 
one respondent worked in academia. About half (48%) experienced a cybersecurity 
incident or data breach while they were in a management role. The demographics of the 
participants are shown in Table 13.  
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics of SMEs (N=25) 
 
Demographic Item Frequency Percentage 
Gender: 
  Male           19          76% 
  Female          6          24% 
Age: 
  20-30          3          12% 
  31-40          6          24% 
  41-50          6          24% 
  51-60          8          32% 
  61-70          2          08% 
Highest Level of Education: 
  Some College        1          04% 
  Associate’s Degree      1          04% 
  Bachelor’s Degree      7          28% 
  Master’s Degree       12          48% 
  Doctoral/Medical/JD Degree   4          16% 
Years of Experience in Cybersecurity: 
  0-5 years         10          40% 
  6-10 years         6          24% 
  11-15 years         3          12% 
  16-20 years         3          12% 
  Over 12 years         3          12% 
Years of Computer Use: 
  11-20 years         5          20% 
  Over 20 years        20          80% 
Current Employment: 
  Academia         1          04% 
  Industry          24          96%  
Experienced a Cybersecurity Incident or Data Breach in a Management Role: 
  No           13          52%  




Identification of Common (1st Order) Cybersecurity Performance Influencing Factors 
Survey participants were provided Common External CS-PIF definitions in Section 
1A and Common Internal CS-PIF definitions in Section 2A. This provided a standard 
definition for the CS-PIFs as provided in the cybersecurity and safety literature. Based on 
the provided definitions and their expertise, the participants were asked to choose to 
Keep, Adjust or Remove each CS-PIF. They were also asked to provide comments if they 
chose to adjust or remove the CS-PIF. The external and internal 1st order CS-PIF 
identification results are examined in the next two sections.  
External 1st Order CS-PIFs 
Figure 16 reveals the survey results for external 1st order CS-PIFs as identified by 
cybersecurity SMEs. Keeping Cybersecurity Awareness as a 1st order external CS-PIF 
ranked lowest at 84%, indicating this is the Cybersecurity SME’s least perceived 
important CS-PIF contributing to human error; 84% still exceeds the 70% SME threshold 
as discussed in Chapter 3. The average consensus for 1st order external CS-PIFs was 
90%. Several interesting comments were provided by the SMEs. A summary is provided 
next. 
Respondent 4 preferred the terms cybersecurity management or cybersecurity 
leadership, over organizational cybersecurity control. Respondent 6 recommended to add 
language to the Organizational Cybersecurity Control definition to include management 
and leadership commitment within the organization. Respondent 8 recommended that 
policies be written to the organization, and not just a template that was copied and pasted 
from another organization. Respondent 10 brought up the construct of “social cultural 




Respondent 16 agreed with procedures, but did not buy into policies, and felt that 
organizations only use them when it is convenient for them. Respondent 24 believed that 
cybersecurity culture in military and private organizations is not where it needs to be in 
equipping end users with the necessary education in cybersecurity concepts to protect 
organizations. None of the comments were indicative of requiring a change.  
 
 
Figure 16: External 1st Order CS-PIF SME Identification (N=25) 
Internal 1st Order CS-PIFs 
Figure 17 reveals the survey results for internal 1st order CS-PIFs as identified by 
cybersecurity SMEs. Keeping Stress, Fatigue, and Emotion as 1st order Internal CS-PIFs 
ranked lowest at 84%, above the 70% SME threshold as discussed in Chapter 3. The 
average consensus for 1st order internal CS-PIFs was 92%. Several interesting comments 
were provided by the SMEs. A summary is provided next. 
Respondent 2 recommended adding internal bribery as a 1st order CS-PIF. Respondent 

























Respondent 24 was not sure why emotion was a CS-PIF and if it should be included. As 
in the external 1st order CS-PIFs, none of the comments were indicative of a required 
change.  
 
Figure 17: Internal 1st Order CS-PIF SME Identification (N=25) 
Validation of Categorization of Higher Order (2nd Order) CS-PIFs 
Following the identification of 1st Order External (Section 1B) and Internal (Section 
2B) CS-PIFs, the participants were asked to validate 2nd Order External (Section 1C) and 
Internal (Section 2C) CS-PIFs. The participants were provided a proposed categorization 
and asked to rate the 2nd Order CS-PIF categorization, with the following criteria: (1) 
Absolutely Inappropriate, (2) Inappropriate, (3) Slightly Inappropriate, (4) Neutral, (5) 
Slightly Appropriate, (6) Appropriate, and (7) Absolutely Appropriate. If they selected 
(1) – (5), they were asked to provide recommended adjustments. The external and 
internal 2nd order CS-PIF validation results are examined in the next two sections.  

























Figure 18 reveals the survey results for external 2nd order CS-PIFs as validated by 
cybersecurity SMEs. Validating Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures as a 2nd order 
CS-PIF was ranked lowest at 88%, above the 70% SME consensus threshold as discussed 
in Chapter 3. The average consensus for 2nd order external CS-PIFs was 93%. Several 
interesting comments were provided by the SMEs. A summary is provided next. 
Respondent 4 was not sure if HCI should be separated from macroergonomics. 
Respondent 9 believed that cybersecurity human error occurs due to “fat finger” errors, 
and that external CS-PIFs have little effect on human error data breaches. Respondent 16 
did not believe that cybersecurity policies and procedures needed to be combined into a 
2nd order. Respondent 25 recommended adding “standards” to cybersecurity policies and 
procedures.  
 
Figure 18: External 2nd Order CS-PIF SME Validation (N=25) 
Internal 2nd Order CS-PIFs 
Figure 19 reveals the survey results for internal 2nd order CS-PIFs as validated by 
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CS-PIF was ranked lowest at 92%, above the 70% SME consensus threshold as discussed 
in Chapter 3. The average consensus for 2nd order internal CS-PIFs was 94%. Two 
comments from the respondents stood out. Respondent 4 felt there was insufficient 
delineation between self-efficacy and factors such as motivation; additionally, they 
believed cybersecurity fitness for duty was too “military” of a term, and recommended 
alternate terms like alertness, composure, readiness. Respondent 17 noted that an 
employee’s cybersecurity KSA may sometimes be deficient, and the manager’s work 
assignment or workload should be considered—indicating a relationship.  
 
Figure 19: Internal 2nd Order CS-PIF SME Validation (N=25) 
Results of the Instrument Development (Phase 1) 
This study originally intended to have multiple rounds of SME feedback, but this 
study far exceeded the minimum consensus of 70% for the Delphi Method in the first 
round (Goode et al., 2018). The lowest subsection consensus was 84%, with an average 
consensus of 91% for 1st order CS-PIF identification, and 93.5% for 2nd order CS-PIF 
validation. By terminating SME feedback in the first round, this study avoided a 
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disadvantage of the Delphi method in that “during the course of multiple sequential 
rounds of collecting Delphi data some members of the experts may not return one or 
more of the survey questionnaires” (Kalaian & Kasim, 2012, p. 2). There was a risk in 
additional rounds by not having as much participation.  
The proposed 1st Order Common Internal and External CS-PIFs were recognized by 
the SMEs as contributors to human error, leading to data breaches. Additionally, the 
proposed 2nd Order Categorization of CS-PIFs were validated by the SMEs to be 
appropriate. During case review, the presence or absence of 1st Order CS-PIFs was 
identified using fuzzy-set criteria. This 1st Order identification translates to 2nd Order CS-
PIF categorization. The complete 1st Order and 2nd Order CS-PIFs and confidence scores 
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Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Phase 2) 
Phase 2 of the Research Design focused on the fsQCA process. It is a six-step process: 
case selection, variable specification, set membership calibration, data matrix, truth table, 
and interpreting results. Figure 21 outlines Phase 2 of the Research Design.  
 
Figure 21: Phase 2 of the Research Design for Empirical Investigation using fsQCA 
Case Selection 
The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) Data Breach Chronology Database was used 
as the dataset. The database was downloaded on June 1st, 2020. This database contained 
9,015 total data breaches entries, of which some are duplicate entries of the same breach. 
The entries varied with the amount of information provided regarding the cases: some 
were very detailed, and some were not detailed at all. The earliest breach made public in 




The database contains eight organization types, as provided previously in Table 11. 
The top 100 cases (in terms of records breached) were examined for each organization 
type. Some of the cases were removed from consideration: 13 entries that were not data 
breaches (e.g. legal disputes), 35 entries did not have enough information to categorize 
and were not found through internet searches, and 42 duplicate case entries were 
removed. When a case was removed, the next biggest case in the same organization type 
was added, to ensure there were 100 cases for each organization type. A total of 800 
cases were reviewed and categorized.  
The cases were reviewed using information listed in the PRC database, but also 
corroborated through media reports, to provide initial classification of the data breaches. 
After the initial review, data breach causes and cause categories began to emerge. With 
respect to this research, the focus was on whether a data breach was caused by (1) human 
error (definitely caused by human error), (2) non-conclusive, or (3) not caused by human 
error (definitely not caused by human error).  
The very specific causes of the data breaches (e.g. software bug, phishing attack, etc.) 
were grouped into higher order categories. Data breaches caused by human error were 
classified into the Human Error Group, with the following sub-categories: 
Misconfiguration, Poor Cybersecurity Hygiene, Social Engineering, and Unintended 
Disclosure. The Non-Conclusive Group have the sub-categories of 3rd Party (Lost IS), 
3rd Party (Stolen IS), 3rd Party (Hacked IS), and Hacked-Possible Error. The Not Human 
Error Group have the categories of Insider Threat, Stolen IS from Secure Area, and 





Human error (Green):  
 
• Misconfiguration 
o Simple/multiple vulnerabilities 
o Sensitive information made publicly accessible/visible 
o Dangerous software installed 
o System/site not properly tested 
o Employee failed to patch a system or close a known vulnerability 
• Poor Cybersecurity Hygiene 
o Reuse of password 
o Using corporate system on public unsecured WiFi 
• Social Engineering 
o Phishing attack 
• Unintended Disclosure 
o Email to wrong recipient(s) 
o Posting PII online or on unprotected/unauthorized server 
o Forgot to remove PII (digital or print) 
o Loss of information systems – except 3rd party loss 
o IS was stolen outside of organization control (e.g. in car) 
o Improper Disposal 
Non-conclusive Human Error / Not Enough Information (Yellow): 
 
• 3rd Party – Lost IS  
o Information system lost, stolen or compromised by 3rd party, to include mail 
• 3rd Party – Stolen IS 
• 3rd Party – Hacked IS 
• Hacked – Possible Error 
o Breach may have been caused by human error, but not enough information to 
be certain 
o Point of sale system hacked (i.e. physical security / logical controls may or 
may not prevent breach) 
Not Human Error (Red): 
 
• Insider Threat 
o Malicious insider threat (e.g. current or ex-employee steals information, or 
trusted 3rd party) 
• Stolen IS from Secure Area 
o Laptop, hard drive, equipment was stolen at an organization site (e.g. break-
in) 
• Unavoidable Hack  
o Zero-day vulnerability data breach 
o Due to unknown software bug 
o Nation state or highly sophisticated hackers that compromised a system that 
was not due to a minor vulnerability. For example, due to APT 
Figure 22: Data Breach Cause Groups and Categories 
 
A review of the 800 cases revealed that 36% of the cases were definitively caused by 
human error, while 17% were definitely not caused by human error. There is a large 47% 




not. Of those indeterminate cases, 14% were caused by a 3rd party (lost, stolen or hacked 
IS). About 86% of the indeterminate cases were caused by hacking, which may have been 
hacked due to human error (e.g. unpatched server). Appendix D and Appendix E contain 
the case review categorization results, and Appendix F contains the results breakdown. 
Figure 23 below contains a high-level summary.  
 
Figure 23: Data Breach Cause Groups by Organization Type 
Variable Specification 
As described previously throughout this report, there are two axis of variables: 
Cybersecurity Performance Influencing Factors (CS-PIF) (conditions) and Cybersecurity 
Human Error (CS-HE) (outcomes). The CS-PIFs were finalized in Phase 1 of this 
research. The 1st order CS-PIFs are the specific CS-PIFs that were identified in the case 
review. Presence of 1st order CS-PIFs attribute to 2nd order CS-PIFs. The 2nd order CS-
PIFs were used to conduct fsQCA. On the other hand, the CS-HEs were developed 
throughout the course of the literature review, specifically, based on the works of 
Rasmussen (1983) and Reason (1990). A summary of the variables is shown in Table 14.  
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Data Breach Cause Groups by Organization Type





Summary of CS-PIFs and CS-HEs 
Conditions Outcomes 
I. Organizational Cybersecurity (ORGC) 
a. Cybersecurity Culture 
b. Organizational Cybersecurity Control 
II. Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures (CPAP) 
a. Cybersecurity Policies 
b. Cybersecurity Procedures 
III. Cybersecurity Education, Training, and Awareness (CETA) 
a. Cybersecurity Education 
b. Cybersecurity Training 
c. Cybersecurity Awareness 
IV. Ergonomics (ERGO) 
a. Human-Computer Interaction 
b. Macro-ergonomics 
V. Cybersecurity Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (CKSA) 
a. Employee Cybersecurity Competency 
b. Employee Cybersecurity Awareness 
c. Employee Cybersecurity Skill 
d. Employee Cybersecurity Self-Efficacy 
VI. Employee Cybersecurity Fitness for Duty (CFFD) 
a. Stress 
b. Fatigue 
c. Situational Awareness 
d. Emotions 
e. Motivations 









Set Membership Calibration 
As explained earlier in this research report, the QCA and fsQCA processes require the 
review of cases, and the identification of the presence or absence of variables (conditions 
and outcomes) within the cases. This “existence” is called membership. In crisp-set QCA, 
(or just QCA), membership is defined using Boolean variables: 1 as existing and 0 as not 
existing. For example, if we were examining the 1st order CS-PIF of fatigue using crisp-




fatigued (=1) or not (=0). As the cases were reviewed using publicly available data, there 
is often ambiguity in membership.  
fsQCA uses fuzzy-set logic to allow for partial membership in sets. This logic more 
accurately relates to the natural world, as societal constructs are not often classified using 
1’s and 0’s. For example, a person may have more democratic or conservative views in 
politics, but they may fit the entirety of views of a certain political party. The fuzzy-set 
criteria used in this research is shown in Figure 24. Additionally, a membership 
calibration rubric was developed using the variables in the preceding section, as shown in 
Appendix G. Due to fsQCA using log-odds, fsQCA cannot compute exactly 0 or 1 
(negative or positive infinity, respectively), so 0 (full non-membership) is adjusted to 
0.05, and 1 (full membership) is adjusted to 0.95 (Pappas & Woodside, 2021; Ragin, 
2008). 
 
Figure 24: Utilized Fuzzy-set Criteria  
Data Matrix 
Of the 800 data breach cases data set, only 291 (36%) of the data breaches were 
definitively caused by human error. These breaches were individually reviewed again to 
assign membership values for conditions (CS-PIFs) and outcomes (CS-HE) using the 
developed fuzzy-set criteria. Data from the PRC database, other data breach databases, 




documents, and other websites were used to identify and assign fuzzy-set membership 
scores for each case.  
Two unconventional methods were used in the case review: social media and archived 
websites. For example, the organization LeafFilter had 838 employees listed on LinkedIn, 
but only one employee was listed as working in security or cybersecurity; this indicated 
that the organization does not place a high priority in cybersecurity resources and implied 
a poor cybersecurity culture. The other unconventional method was using the tool 
Wayback Machine, to either find websites or articles that were once online but no longer 
accessible via the original URL (companies don’t like to keep their dirty laundry online if 
not necessary), or to find old versions of sites to infer information. For example, Purdue 
University did not have an IT Security Incident Response procedure posted online in 
2017 but did have one following their 2018 data breach.  
Unfortunately, provided best efforts, not all the 291 data breach cases that were caused 
by human error could be used for the final data set. There was simply not enough public 
information to effectively assign membership values for CS-PIFs and CS-HEs. After 
several iterations of case review, 102 cases remained. Each case was provided 
justification for each fuzzy-set assignment and captured in a document, along with links, 
for documentation and replication purposes. A sample of a case review is shown in 
Appendix H. The final data matrix is displayed in Appendix I and Appendix J. The CS-
PIFs and CS-HEs acronyms were used for the data matrix are presented in Table 15.  
Table 15 
Conditions and Outcomes Used 




During the case review and data matrix process, it was discovered that ergonomics 
(human computer interaction and macro-ergonomics) had very minimal mention in the 
available data. Only 21 of the 102 cases mentioned this condition. Examples of such 
mention included communication breakdown, manning issues, or changes in processes. 
For those cases that did not mention this construct, it was difficult to infer if ERGO was 
present or absent per the fsQCA calibration rubric. For this reason and the effect on the 
results, ERGO was not included in the remaining steps for fsQCA. This is a known 
limitation in some fsQCA research studies, and it would be problematic to assume or 
assign a value to ERGO without sufficient data (de Block & Vis, 2019). Removing 
conditions from the study is acceptable for the robustness of QCA findings (de Block & 
Vis, 2019).  
What also occurred during the data matrix process, was identification of the size of the 
organization that was breached. This was accomplished using publicly available data that 
was closest to the year of the breach (e.g. corporate financial reports). There were five 
organization size categories, and they were combined into 3, as show in Figure 25.  
Cybersecurity Performance Influencing 
  Organizational Cybersecurity           ORGC 
  Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures        CPAP 
  Cybersecurity Education, Training, and Awareness   CETA 
  Ergonomics                ERGO 
  Cybersecurity Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities     CKSA 
  Employee Cybersecurity Fitness for Duty       CFFD 
Cybersecurity Human Error Type: 
  Skill Based Error               SBE 
  Role Based Mistake              RBM 





100,001 - 1,000,000 employees (6 organizations)
10,001 - 100,000 employees (15 organizations)
1,001 - 10,000 employees (40 organizations)
101 - 1,000 employees (30 organizations)
1 - 100 employees (11 organizations)
Small Organizations (SO) (41 organizations)
Medium Organizations (MO) (40 organizations)
Large Organizations (LO) (21 organizations)
 
Figure 25: Organization Size Criteria  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
Necessary conditions are conditions that are required for the outcome to occur 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Conditions are labeled necessary or almost necessary if they 
exceed a consistency threshold of 0.80 or above (Balle et al., 2019; Henriques et al., 
2019; Ragin, 2000). Table 16 presents fsQCA results testing necessary conditions for 
SBE, RBM, and KBM. ~CKSA is a necessary condition for all cybersecurity human error 
outcomes. In other words, poor cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and abilities is almost 
always necessary (or present) when cybersecurity human error occurs that leads to data 
breaches, in cases observed. 
Table 16 
Necessary Conditions Summary 
 SBE RBM KBM 













0.392   0.421 
0.751   0.390 
0.415   0.336 
0.728   0.448 
0.360   0.373 
0.783   0.414 
0.692   0.400 
0.451   0.400 
0.287   0.426 
0.855   0.392 
0.369   0.287 
0.774   0.493 
0.461   0.421 
0.707   0.311 
0.582   0.400 
0.586   0.307 
0.491   0.432 
0.677   0.304 
0.607   0.298 
0.561   0.422 
0.366   0.461 
0.802   0.312 
0.541   0.356 
0.627   0.339 
0.368   0.465 
0.754   0.460 
0.519   0.495 
0.602   0.437 
0.402   0.491 
0.719   0.447 
0.694   0.472 
0.428   0.446 
0.307   0.536 
0.814   0.439 
0.634   0.579 




ORGC=Organizational Cybersecurity; CPAP=Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures; 
CETA=Cybersecurity Education, Training, and Awareness; ERGO=Ergonomics; CKSA=Cybersecurity 
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities; CFFD=Cybersecurity Fitness for Duty 
 
Truth Table 
After the condition and outcome membership assignment for the 102 cases were 
entered into a data matrix, the next step was to input the data matrix (in CSV format) into 
fsQCA software. Publicly available fsQCA 3.1b software was used to run data analysis. 
The truth table transforms the raw data into all logical combinations of the conditions and 
outcome selected for analysis. For example, for the model “SBE = f(ORGC, CPAP, 
CETA, ERGO, CKSA, CFFD”, there are 32 possible configurations of conditions that 
lead to the outcome SBE. The formula to determine the possible combinations is 2n where 
n equals the number of conditions. Since there were only 102 cases, only some 
configurations were present in the model (some many times), whereas some 
configurations were not.  
When examining the truth table, irrelevant combinations must be removed using 
frequency and consistency thresholds. The frequency threshold was set to a number that 
exceeds at least 80% of the cases. The consistency threshold was set to 80% (0.80). A 
truth table example with researcher’s filter descriptions (in red) is shown in Figure 26. 






Figure 26: Truth Table Example for SBE = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD  
 
 
Figure 27: Truth Table Example for SBE = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD 
following setting frequency and consistency thresholds 
Interpreting Results 
Fuzzy-set qualitative analysis was conducted using fsQCA 3.1b software. Figure 28 
shows the models executed and the resulting intermediate solution consistency, with 




requirement (Ragin, 2008). The Freq Cutoff row in Figure 28 is the frequency threshold 
used for the truth table. Only the presence of outcomes were examined, and not the 
absence (~SBE, ~RBM, and ~KBM), as these the absence of one type of error equates to 
the presence of another kind of error, as opposed to a non-error caused data breach. “~” 
denotes the absence of a condition or outcome (Fiss, 2007), and “*” denotes the logical 
operator “AND” (Curado et al., 2016). Seven of the 36 models met the recommended 
solution consistency requirement of 0.80 (Balle et al., 2019; Henriques et al., 2019; 
Ragin, 2008).  
 
Figure 28: Research Questions fsQCA Results 
 
Table 17 displays a summary of the fsQCA results against the research questions. The 
cells with checkmarks met the frequency and consistency thresholds revealing sufficient 
configuration of conditions leading to the outcomes (SBE, RBM, or KBM). The sections 
that proceed Table 17 provide details and interpretation of the results for the models that 
met the frequency and consistency thresholds. 
Table 17 




Research Question Filter Data Set Cases SBE RBM KBM 
RQ3 None Entire Dataset 102    
RQ4a Data Breach Type Unintended Disclosure 39    
RQ4b Data Breach Type System Misconfiguration 21    
RQ4c Data Breach Type Social Engineering 19    
RQ4d Data Breach Type Poor Cybersecurity Hygiene 23    
RQ5a1 Organization Type Business – Finance/Retail/Other 33    
RQ5a2 Organization Type Education / Non-Profit 22    
RQ5a3 Organization Type Government 27    
RQ5a4 Organization Type Medical 20    
RQ5b1 Organization Size Small Organizations 41    
RQ5b2 Organization Size Medium Organizations 40    
RQ5b3 Organization Size Large Organizations 21    
 
Solutions of Sufficient Configurations of Conditions 
The intermediate and parsimonious solutions are both provided, as recommended in 
the literature (Fiss, 2011; Henriques et al., 2019; Ragin, 2008). The intermediate solution 
is used primarily, as it serves as the conservative solution and provides simpler 
assumptions (Henriques et al., 2019). The parsimonious solution instead only contains 
conditions highly linked to the outcome (Oliveira, Curado, & Henriques, 2019; Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2010). Comparing the intermediate and parsimonious solutions allows 
identification of conditions present in both sets; these conditions present in both 
intermediate and parsimonious solutions are called core conditions whereas those 
conditions only present in the intermediate solutions are called peripheral conditions 





RQ4b RBM: System Misconfiguration Caused Breaches 
Of the 102 total data breaches, 21 of them were caused by system misconfiguration. 
Examples of this data breach type include website misconfiguration and file server 
misconfiguration. Understandably, most of the system misconfiguration caused data 
breaches were a result of a Rule-Based Mistake (RBM). The fsQCA results are displayed 
in Table 18. 
Table 18 
RQ4b RBM: System Misconfiguration Caused Breaches Solutions 
Model: RBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Frequency cutoff: 1.00 
Consistency cutoff: 0.829201 
 
Intermediate Solution (RBM) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
~ORGC*~CETA*~CKSA     0.534      0.376       0.943 
CPAP*~CKSA*CFFD      0.285      0.054       0.858 
ORGC*CETA*~CKSA*~CFFD   0.241      0.018       1.000 
ORGC*CPAP*CETA*~CFFD    0.259      0.036       1.000 
Solution Coverage: 0.779527 
Solution Consistency: 0.942857 
 
Parsimonious solution (RBM) 
No parsimonious solutions 
 
 
RQ4c SBE: Social Engineering Caused Breaches 
Of the 102 total data breaches, 19 of them were caused by social engineering. 18 of 
the 19 data breaches were caused by phishing via email, categorized under the Skills-
Based Error (SBE). One of the 19 data breaches was a more sophisticated attack where an 
anonymous internet user manipulated an administrator into downloading a malicious web 
browser extension, categorized as a Knowledge-Based Mistake (KBM). The fsQCA 






RQ4c SBE: Social Engineering Caused Breaches Solutions 
Model: SBE = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Frequency cutoff: 1.00 
Consistency cutoff: 0.930259 
 
Intermediate Solution (SBE) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
~ORGC*~CETA*~CKSA     0.777      0.571       0.937 
ORGC*CETA*~CKSA*~CFFD   0.177      0.020       1.000 
CPAP*~CETA*~CKSA*~CFFD   0.226      0.000       1.000 
ORGC*CPAP*~CKSA*~CFFD   0.209      0.000       1.000 
Solution Coverage: 0.869388 
Solution Consistency: 0.943074 
 
Parsimonious solution (SBE) 
No parsimonious solutions 
 
 
RQ4d KBM: Poor Cybersecurity Hygiene Caused Breaches 
Of the 102 total data breaches, 23 of them were a result of poor cybersecurity hygiene 
by the employee or user. These were a result of the intentional disregard for policy—such 
as leaving a company laptop or drive in their car or other unsecured location, connecting 
to an unsecured wireless network, sending sensitive files unencrypted, or other 
intentional decision that ended up being a mistake. All 23 of these data breaches were a 
result of a Knowledge-Based Mistake (KBM). The fsQCA results are displayed in Table 
20. 
Table 20 
RQ4d KBM: Poor Cybersecurity Hygiene Caused Breaches Solutions 
Model: KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Frequency cutoff: 1.00 
Consistency cutoff: 1.00 
 




Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
~ORGC*~CPAP*~CETA*~CKSA   0.777      0.571       0.937 
~ORGC*CPAP*~CETA*CFFD   0.177      0.020       1.000 
ORGC*CPAP*CETA*~CKSA    0.226      0.000       1.000 
ORGC*CETA*CKSA*CFFD    0.209      0.000       1.000 
~ORGC*CPAP*CETA*CKSA*~CFFD 0.209      0.000       1.000 
Solution Coverage: 0.730892 
Solution Consistency: 1.00 
 
Parsimonious solution (KBM) 
No parsimonious solutions 
 
 
RQ5a1 KBM: All Business Organizations 
Research question 5 seeks to identify fsQCA sufficiency among organization types 
and organization sizes. Cases with organizations categorized under Business-Finance 
(BSF), Business-Retail (BSR), and Business-Other (BSO) were combined into one data 
set for fsQCA. The fsQCA results are displayed in Table 21. Note that the parsimonious 
solution for RQ5a1 did not meet the consistency threshold of 0.80, but is listed here as a 
limitation. 
Table 21 
RQ5a1 KBM: All Business Organizations Solutions 
Model: KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Frequency cutoff: 1.00 
Consistency cutoff: 0.834808 
 
Intermediate Solution (KBM) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
~ORGC*CPAP*~CETA*CKSA*CFFD 0.227      0.227       0.835 
Solution Coverage: 0.227309 
Solution Consistency: 0.834808 
 
Parsimonious solution (KBM) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
CPAP*~CETA*CKSA      0.250      0        0.649 
~CETA*CKSA*CFFD      0.317      0        0.738 
~ORGC*CKSA*CFFD      0.317      0.02249      0.825 
solution coverage: 0.339759 





RQ5a2 RBM: Education/Non-Profit Organizations 
Due to the low number of cases for Education (16) and Non-Profit (NGO) (6), these 
cases were combined into one data set for fsQCA. These organization types were 
combined as the potential external threats against these organizations may be similar, as 
opposed to business or government organizations. The fsQCA results are displayed in 
Table 22. Note that the parsimonious solution for RQ5a2 did not meet the consistency 
threshold of 0.80, but is listed here as a limitation. 
Table 22 
RQ5a2 RBM: Education/Non-Profit Organizations Solutions 
Model: RBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Frequency cutoff: 1.00 
Consistency cutoff: 0.820513 
 
Intermediate Solution (RBM) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
~ORGC*CPAP*CETA*~CKSA*CFFD 0.253      0.253       0.821 
Solution Coverage: 0.253465 
Solution Consistency: 0.820513 
 
Parsimonious solution (RBM) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
~ORGC*CPAP*CETA      0.253      0.000       0.821 
~ORGC*CPAP*CFFD      0.281      0.028       0.772 
~ORGC*CETA*CFFD      0.253      0.000       0.821 
solution coverage: 0.281188 
solution consistency: 0.771739 
 
RQ5a3 KBM: Government Organizations 
Of the 102 cases, 27 of them were data breaches in government organizations. fsQCA 
was performed on the data set of government organizations. The fsQCA results are 
displayed in Table 23. 
Table 23 




Model: KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Frequency cutoff: 1.00 
Consistency cutoff: 0.866983 
 
Intermediate Solution (KBM) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
ORGC*CPAP*~CKSA*~CFFD   0.240      0.020       0.934 
~ORGC*CPAP*~CKSA*CFFD   0.348      0.112       0.873 
ORGC*~CPAP*CETA*CKSA*CFFD  0.152      0.020       0.900 
ORGC*CPAP*CETA*~CKSA    0.294      0.000       0.946 
CPAP*CETA*~CKSA*CFFD    0.327      0.000       0.907 
Solution Coverage: 0.517117 
Solution Consistency: 0.884892 
 
Parsimonious solution (KBM) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
ORGC*CPAP        0.348      0.037       0.954 
CPAP*CFFD         0.473      0.112       0.904 
CKSA           0.219      0.017       0.813 
ORGC*CETA        0.331      0.017       0.868 
ORGC*CFFD        0.311      0.000       0.902 
CETA*CFFD         0.365      0.000       0.878 
solution coverage: 0.584385 
solution consistency: 0.874214 
 
RQ5b3 KBM: Large Organizations 
Of the 102 cases, 21 of them were data breaches with large organizations (10,001+ 
employees). fsQCA was performed on the data set of only large organizations. The 
fsQCA results are displayed in Table 24. 
Table 24 
RQ5b3 KBM: Large Organizations Solutions 
Model: KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Frequency cutoff: 1.00 
Consistency cutoff: 0.808917 
 
Intermediate Solution (KBM) 
Causal configuration       Raw coverage   Unique coverage    Cons. 
~ORGC*~CETA*~CKSA*CFFD   0.484      0.185       0.873 
~ORGC*CPAP*~CKSA*CFFD   0.369      0.071       0.840 
~ORGC*CPAP*CETA*CKSA*~CFFD 0.153      0.049       0.874 
Solution Coverage: 0.603137 
Solution Consistency: 0.895227 
 
Parsimonious solution (KBM) 




~ORGC*CFFD        0.576      0.336       0.891 
~ORGC*CETA        0.224      0.000       0.911 
~ORGC*CKSA        0.197      0.000       0.890 
solution coverage: 0.603137 
solution consistency: 0.895227 
 
Solutions Summary 
Table 17 displays a summary of the models that exceed the prescribed minimum 
overall solution consistency (>=0.80) requirements. Coverage describes how much of the 
outcome is explained by the configurations (Pappas & Woodside, 2021; Ragin & Davey, 
2017). Overall solution coverage should fall between the .25 and .90 range (Gonçalves et 
al., 2021; Ragin, 2008). The coverage minimum is not met in RQ5a1 KBM (.22). Several 
researchers have stressed the importance of high consistency over high coverage, and 
thus RQ5a1 KBM is presented in Table 25 as acceptable, but as a limitation (Huarng, 
2015; Woodside & Zhang, 2013).  
Table 25 
FsQCA Solutions Summary 
  Solution 
Model Configurations Coverage Consist. 
System Misconfiguration RBM = 






Social Engineering SBE =  






Poor Cybersecurity Hygiene KBM = 







BSF/BSO/BSR KBM =  
f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
~ORGC*CPAP*~CETA*CKSA*CFFD .227309 .834808 
EDU/NGO RBM =  
f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
~ORGC*CPAP*CETA*~CKSA*CFFD .253465 .820513 
GOV KBM =  










LO KBM =  






There were five configurations that fit multiple models. These models require careful 
consideration as they were responsible for multiple data breach types in the cases 
reviewed. Table 26 displays common sufficient configurations that fit different models. 
Table 26 
FsQCA Configurations that Fit Multiple Models 
Sufficient Configurations Models 
ORGC*CPAP*CETA*~CKSA Poor Cybersecurity Hygiene KBM=f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
GOV KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
~ORGC*~CETA*~CKSA System Misconfiguration RBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Social Engineering SBE = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
~ORGC*CPAP*~CKSA*CFFD GOV KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
LO KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
ORGC*CPAP*~CKSA*~CFFD Social Engineering SBE = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
GOV KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
ORGC*CETA*~CKSA*~CFFD System Misconfiguration RBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
Social Engineering SBE = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
 
Summary 
This chapter covered Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Research Design (Figure 12). The 
objective of Phase 1 was the Instrument Development for conditions that were used for 
fsQCA. Cybersecurity SMEs participated in an online survey to aid with instrument 
development. Survey demographics of the SMEs were presented and discussed. The 
cybersecurity SME feedback resulted in the positive identification of 1st order CS-PIFs 
and validation of 2nd order CS-PIFs, using the Delphi method. As a result, Research 




Upon completion of Phase 1, Phase 2 progressed through the fsQCA steps: case 
selection, variable specification, set membership calibration, producing the truth table 
and interpreting results of the fsQCA solutions. Eight hundred data breach cases were 
reviewed and categorized. Two hundred and ninety-one data breaches were found to have 
been caused by human error; these 291 cases were further sub-categorized into four data 
breach types of unintended disclosure, system misconfiguration, social engineering, and 
poor cybersecurity hygiene, as well as the organization size. Of those 291 cases, only 102 
cases had enough qualitative information for conditions and outcomes to transform into 
fuzzy-set values. Each of the 102 cases were notated using researcher developed fuzzy-
set criteria for the data matrix. The data matrix was transformed into a truth table, cleaned 
of irrelevant configurations, then fsQCA was executed to produce solutions. Seven 
specific models produced sufficient configurations of conditions and those were 








Conclusions, Discussions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Conclusions 
The research problem that this study addressed is that organizational data breaches 
caused by human error are both costly and have the most significant impact on Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) breaches (81.5%) (Greitzer et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2019; 
Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). Of the 800 data breaches reviewed, 36% were definitively 
caused by CS-HE and 47% were possibly caused by CS-HE. CS-HE caused data 
breaches continues to be a prevalent and expensive problem for many organizations 
around the world. To begin to address this longstanding problem, the main goal of this 
research study was to employ configurational analysis to empirically assess the 
conjunctural causal relationship of internal (individual) and external (organizational and 
contextual) Cybersecurity Performance Influencing Factors (CS-PIFs) leading to 
Cybersecurity Human Error (CS-HE) (SBE, RBM, and KBM) that resulted in the largest 
data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US. 
This research first needed to identify the factors that led to CS-HE. A thorough 
exploration and comprehensive understanding of the conditions—cybersecurity 
performance influencing factors—leading to cybersecurity human error types (skills-




research. Each case had a unique set of individual and organizational circumstances that 
led to the data breach. Thus, the first goal of this research study identified, using 
cybersecurity Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), the most common internal (individual) and 
external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to human error that resulted in 
data breaches. Eighteen tangible or identifiable internal and external CS-PIFs (i.e. 
factors) that may attribute to CS-HE were identified (see Figure 16 and 17). The 
consensus among 25 cybersecurity SMEs for identified 1st order CS-PIFs was 91.1%.  
Effective fsQCA practice requires limiting the number of conditions for analysis, with 
the number of conditions in QCA studies ranging from two to 10 (Douglas et al., 2020; 
Marx et al., 2013; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). Due to this, the 18 identified 1st order 
CS-PIFs were logically organized into higher order (i.e. 2nd order) CS-PIFs, and 
validated using cybersecurity SMEs. Therefore, the second goal of this research study 
validated, using cybersecurity SMEs, the higher-order set of the most common internal 
(individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to human error 
that resulted in data breaches. Six 2nd order CS-PIFs were proposed: organizational 
cybersecurity; cybersecurity policy and procedures; cybersecurity education, training, and 
awareness; cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and abilities; employee cybersecurity fitness 
for duty; and ergonomics. Twenty five cybersecurity SMEs validated the 2nd order CS-
PIFs with a consensus of 94%.  
The third specific goal of this study was to assess the alternative configurations of 
internal (individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to (a) 
skill-based errors; (b) rule-based mistakes; and (c) knowledge-based mistakes resulting in 




This goal conducted fsQCA against the entire data set of 102 cases of data breaches 
caused by CS-HE. Thirty-four of the data breaches were caused by skill-based errors, 28 
of the data breaches were caused by rule-based mistakes, and 41 of the data breaches 
were caused by knowledge-based mistakes. There were no alternative configurations or 
solutions that met the consistency thresholds, to signify sufficiency in combinations of 
CS-PIFs. In other words, of the 102 total observed human error caused data breaches, 
there were no solutions of sufficient configurations (CS-PIFs that led to CS-HE).  
The fourth specific goal of this study was to assess the alternative configurations of 
CS-PIFs responsible for CS-HE leading to various data breaches caused by: (a) 
unintended disclosure; (b) system misconfiguration; (c) social engineering; and (d) poor 
cybersecurity hygiene in the largest data breaches across multiple organization types 
from 2007 to 2019 in the US. When dissecting the data, by data breach types, several 
alternative configurations and solutions did exceed the consistency thresholds: system 
misconfiguration data breach types caused by rule-based mistakes, social engineering 
data breach types caused by rule-based mistakes, and poor cybersecurity hygiene data 
breach types caused by knowledge-based mistakes. These solutions contained alternative 
sufficient configurations that led to the respective data breaches.  
The fifth specific goal of this study was to assess how alternative configurations of 
CS-PIFs on CS-HE leading to the largest data breaches across multiple organization types 
from 2007 to 2019 in the US were represented across (a) industry type and (b) company 
size. These two modified data sets also produced alternative configurations. By 
organization type, business-type organizations caused by knowledge-based mistakes, 




type organizations caused by knowledge-based mistakes. By size of the organization, 
only the large organization solution met the consistency thresholds, of those caused by 
knowledge-based mistakes.  
The results of the study are only as accurate as the data, and a weakness in the study is 
the availability of standardized and detailed data on the data breach cases. Of the 800 
cases initially evaluated, only 102 of the cases had enough information to assign 
membership values for CS-HE and CS-PIFs. Even of these 102 cases, careful 
interpretation and best judgement for implication was used by the researcher to assign 
values for fsQCA. Extensive case evaluation across the publicly available data, and 
documentation of the case review process was conducted to improve internal validity as 
much as possible. Still, an inherent weakness exists in the research study due to available 
data.  
Discussion 
The literature has shown that human error and performance influencing factors vary 
based on context (Boring, 2010; Gawron et al., 2006; Shappell et al., 2007). This was 
evident as CS-HEs and CS-PIFs varied widely between the observed cases, data breach 
types, and organization sizes and types. The context mattered as well when considering 
that research question 3 (all data breaches) returned no acceptable fsQCA solutions, but 
research questions 4 and 5 (compartmentalized data sets) did. The one constant is that 
~CKSA (the deficiency of cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and abilities) was a necessary 
condition for data breaches caused by skill-based errors (n=0.85), rule-based mistakes 
(n=0.80), and knowledge-based mistakes (n=0.81). ~CKSA was a condition in 16 of the 




At a high level, other patterns were apparent from the dataset of 102 cases. First, and 
not surprisingly, rule-based mistakes caused 20 of the 21 system misconfiguration data 
breach types, with one being a knowledge-based mistake where the US Department of 
Energy employee did not have the expertise to patch commonly known exploits. 
Similarly, 18 of 19 social engineering data breach types were caused by skills-based 
error, showing that training alone does not prevent these types of attacks. A potential 
prevention strategy could be to move the user from skills-based performance to rule-
based or knowledge-based performance, by means of having the user perform conscious 
(instead of sub-conscious) actions (e.g. user confirmation before allowing link from an 
external email sender to proceed). Finally—and also not surprisingly—knowledge-based 
mistakes caused 23 of the 23 data breaches of the poor cybersecurity hygiene variety, 
demonstrating that about a quarter of observed data breaches were intentional but non-
malicious.  
It must be understood that the findings of this research must not be mistook as 
evidence of predicting future CS-PIF configurations to CS-HE. fsQCA views causation 
as conjuncture and context specific (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). In other words, the 
solutions uncovered in this research reflect the cases observed and analyzed, and future 
data breaches in a different context (time and space) may or may not have the same 
causal recipes. The solutions do indicate potential causal pathways to consider for the 
future.  
Implications 
There had been a major research and knowledge gap in cybersecurity within the 




contributions to cybersecurity human errors existed, but a comprehensive review of these 
factors had yet to be conducted. Additionally, the importance of the interaction between 
the factors was not realized. A holistic approach to understanding CS-HE as a result, was 
not readily apparent. This research provided clarity that CS-PIFs and their interaction 
leads to CS-HE, and there are multiple alternative configurations that lead to different 
types of CS-HEs. Additionally, there is no magic bullet: the various configurations are 
dependent on the context (data breach type, industry type, and company size).  
Another major contribution is the introduction of QCA to cybersecurity research. 
Introduced in 1987 by Sociologist Charles Ragin, the research method has quickly spread 
from sociology research into many other disciplines (Thomann & Maggetti, 2017), to 
include information systems (Pappas & Woodside, 2021). As a comparative case research 
method, QCA and the derivative fsQCA, has potential applications in various 
cybersecurity research streams, to include examples of human-computer interaction and 
security, user compliance, and security management. The applications are limitless as 
organizations vary across cultures, geography, industries, and time.  
Recommendations 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the ergonomics CS-PIF was not included in the data 
analysis due to uncertainty of presence or absence in the cases, based on the text of 
available data. Only 21 of the 102 cases mentioned the condition in the available data, 
and when it was mentioned, it was a factor that contributed to the error. For 81 of the 
cases, it was ambiguous as to if it was a factor or not. It is possible that the 
acknowledgement of ergonomics’ importance is not realized as it is not regularly 




ergonomics, in combination with other factors. Further research may consider further 
investigating the role of ergonomics in data breaches.  
Other possibilities for future research include different datasets. In this research, the 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse data breach dataset was used. During the research process, 
PRC stopped collecting data on data breaches, so the cases were limited from to January 
2005 to Oct 2019. Other data breach data sets may possibility contain more detailed 
information or more recent data. It appeared that generally the more recent the data 
breach, the more detailed the data that are available. This is especially true in the earlier 
cases (e.g. 2005), where data breach laws were not as prevalent and reporting was 
generally not required. An example of a potential resource could be the US Department 
of Health and Human Services, that still investigates and reports data breaches; the 
inherent limitation is that those organizations more often align with the healthcare 
industry (reducing generalizability). Last, US based organizations and data breaches were 
examined. Examining international data breaches, along with international individual and 
organizational factors may provide different results. 
As the applicability of fsQCA is context specific, further research may consider 
examining more detailed investigation into the relationships between 1st order CS-PIFs, 
as well as the relationships between 2nd order CS-PIFs. An extensive number of research 
studies recognized relationships between factors that cause human error, but a 
comprehensive list that is validated via quantitative research methods has not. It is 
possible that not every 1st and 2nd order CS-PIF has been identified, and future research 
may uncover new causes to degraded performance. Finally, future research studies may 




Modeling) to extend the research presented in this dissertation, as has been done by other 
researchers (Crespo et al., 2021; Gonçalves et al., 2021; Santos et al., 2021).  
Summary 
Information systems are critical for most organizations to function and thrive. Data 
breaches on information systems are inherent risks to organizations of all types and sizes. 
The perpetual reliance on information systems and increase in data breaches has 
produced widespread academic and commercial interest in cybersecurity.  
Data breaches can be caused by external or internal actors. Internal actors can 
intentionally or unintentionally cause data breaches. These insider threats that 
unintentionally cause data breaches commit these actions during periods of degraded 
performance, namely skill-based performance, rule-based performance, or knowledge-
based performance types. These performance failures produce cybersecurity human error: 
skill-based errors, rule-based mistakes, or knowledge-based mistakes. 
Cybersecurity performance influencing factors affect human performance. The effect 
can be positive or negative, depending on how the CS-PIF influences the individual. 
Through a review of the literature and during Phase 1 (Instrument Development) in the 
Research Design of this dissertation, six CS-PIFs emerged. The CS-PIFs are 
organizational cybersecurity; cybersecurity education, training, and awareness; 
cybersecurity policies and procedures; ergonomics; cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and 
abilities; and cybersecurity fitness for duty. Identified in the safety and cybersecurity 
literature, these CS-PIFs were validated with the assistance of cybersecurity SMEs, as 




Of the 800 data breach cases that were reviewed, 291 of them were caused by CS-HE. 
Of those, 102 data breaches had enough data to be chosen for content analysis. Due to 
low mention in the data during the content analysis process, ergonomics–organizational 
work factors and human-computer interaction–was removed from consideration in the 
study. The five remaining CS-PIFs were not present (or deficient) on average in 75% of 
the cases, though no one case had all present (or ideal) CS-PIFs. In other words, it was 
evident that there was a combination of CS-PIFs that led to a CS-HE, that resulted in the 
data breach.  
fsQCA is a comparative case method that allows a researcher to expose single or 
multiple sufficient configurations (causal recipes) of conditions that lead to outcomes. In 
this research, the conditions are the CS-PIFs and the outcomes are the CS-HE types. 
Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis—Phase 2 of the Research Design—was 
conducted using a 6-step process: case selection, variable specification, set membership 
calibration, data matrix, truth table, and interpreting results. The research method requires 
careful selection of cases and specification of variables, fuzzy-set membership calibration 
and assignment of values to conditions and outcomes, based on the presence or absence 
of each. Each of the 102 data breaches (cases) were reviewed several times and tabulated 
on the presence or absence of CS-PIFs and CS-HE types using the researcher developed 
fuzzy-set calibration criteria, and input into a data matrix. Followed input of the data 
matrix in fsQCA software, the truth table was populated. The truth table lists every 
possible logical combination of conditions and counts the instances of each from the 




consistency thresholds produces the fsQCA solutions, which allows interpretation of the 
results. 
On interpretating the results, the main research question was answered, being: What is 
the conjunctural causal relationship, using configurational analysis, of internal 
(individual) and external (organizational and contextual) CS-PIFs leading to CS-HE that 
resulted in the largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 
in the US? The identification of 1st order and validation of 2nd order CS-PIFS answered 
research questions 1 and 2. The main research question was addressed by answering 
research questions 4 and 5.  
RQ4. What alternative configurations of CS-PIFs are responsible for CS-HE leading 
to various data breaches caused by: (a) unintended disclosure; (b) system 
misconfiguration; (c) social engineering, and (d) poor cybersecurity hygiene, in the 
largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US? 
Table 27 
RQ4 FsQCA Solutions 
Model Configurations 
RQ4b RBM: System Misconfiguration Caused Breaches 





RQ4c SBE: Social Engineering Caused Breaches 





RQ4d KBM: Poor Cybersecurity Hygiene Caused Breaches  










RQ5. How are the alternative configurations of CS-PIFs on CS-HE leading to the 
largest data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US, 
represented across (a) industry type and (b) company size? 
Table 28 
RQ5 FsQCA Solutions 
Model Configurations 
RQ5a1 KBM: All Business Organizations Solutions 
KBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
~ORGC*CPAP*~CETA*CKSA*CFFD 
RQ5a2 RBM: Education/Non-Profit Organizations Solutions 
RBM = f(ORGC, CPAP, CETA, CKSA, CFFD) 
~ORGC*CPAP*CETA*~CKSA*CFFD 
RQ5a3 KBM: Government Organizations Solutions 






RQ5b3 KBM: Large Organizations Solutions 





The main goal of this research study was to employ configurational analysis—
specifically, Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Analysis (fsQCA)—to empirically assess the 
conjunctural causal relationship of internal (individual) and external (organizational and 
contextual) Cybersecurity Performance Influencing Factors (CS-PIFs) leading to 
Cybersecurity Human Error (CS-HE) (SBE, RBM, and KBM) that resulted in the largest 
data breaches across multiple organization types from 2007 to 2019 in the US. Utilizing 
data collected from 102 data breach cases, this research found that multiple combinations, 
or causal recipes, of CS-PIFs led to certain CS-HEs, that resulted in data breaches. 
Specifically, seven of the 36 fsQCA models had solution consistencies that exceeded the 
minimum threshold of 0.80, thereby providing argument for the contextual nature of CS-
PIFs, CS-HE, and data breaches. Two additional findings were also discovered—five 




cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and abilities is a necessary condition for all 







Expert Panel Recruitment Email 
 
Dear Information Systems and Cybersecurity Expert.  
 
I request your expert feedback in identify and validating instruments for an upcoming 
doctoral research study. I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Systems at the College of 
Engineering and Computing at Nova Southeastern University (NSU), working under the 
supervision of Professor Yair Levy (levyy@nova.edu), and a member of the Levy CyLab 
(http://CyLab.nova.edu/). My research study focuses on contributors to human error, 
which may lead to data breaches.   
 
Completion of the survey takes 20-30 minutes. Information provided in the survey will 
be used for the research study in aggregated form, and no Personal Identifiable 
Information (PII) will be collected. By clicking on the link below to access the survey, 
you consent to participate in this study and agree to keep all information regarding this 
research confidential.  
 
• Survey: https://forms.gle/17S2SzQFHe9U7syLA 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration in participating in this important research. 
If you would like to receive the findings of this study, please email me with your request 
and contact information, and I will be happy to provide upon conclusion of the study. 
Additionally, it would be most appreciated if you would share this survey with your 



















Qualitative Survey: Instrument for Identification of Cybersecurity 
Performance Influencing Factors (CS-PIFs) and Validation of Higher-Order 
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Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
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